



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A CONTINUING EXPERIMENT IN URBAN LAND REFORM: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE

Asteya M. Santiago

The Imperative for Urban Land Reform

Deliberately in many cases, and unknowingly in others, the Philippine government has, for decades now, been engaged in a continuing experiment in urban land reform. While this experiment has been launched in pursuit of a long string of objectives, more particularly as the country shifted to a comprehensive and "wholistic" approach to urban development, its central concern has been that of making lands available for basic urban needs. In this hierarchy of needs, housing and support services enjoy top priority.

This inevitable focus of urban land reform in the Philippines of ensuring land availability is a candid confession of the peculiar features of the land situation in the country. The country has been aware of some of these features early in its experiment, but others, it realized much later after some trial and error. For instance, the Philippines has long been told, and time and again retold by experts what it already know but seemed to stubbornly ignore in practice: that while it is not afflicted with land starvation, it hypochondriacally displays all the symptoms of this malady. Its problem has been diagnosed as that of "land refrigeration", where much of the land in the urban and urbanizing districts lies frozen in the hands of those who manifest no intention of developing it within a reasonable or a foreseeable time. This has been the root cause of many of the social, political, and economic aberrations that hold the country in a tight grip such as the uncontrolled spiraling of the value of lands; the wasteful leap frogging of urban development in places out of or beyond the path of planned development; the premature conversion of productive agricultural lands and the more universal and persistent of these problems, that of squatting. The pernicious presence of "hold outs" is also

a major contributing factor to the frustrated effort at planned development of urban areas.

Concentrating its efforts on ensuring the availability of lands for housing and support service is a factor of the unpredecided growth of the country's urban areas and the predominance of the urban poor. Thus, while the country is categorized as an agricultural country, statistics do not fully support this classification. In 1984 over one third of its populace were already residing in 60 chartered cities and in 1,568 other urban areas. In relation to its Southeast Asian neighbors, the Philippines ranks second in terms of absolute urban population, next to Indonesia, and ranks third in terms of the proportion of people located in urban areas.

No accurate and updated statistics of the slum and squatter population exists in the country, but estimates in 1985 show that in major urban centers, they have reached the 1 million mark. This represent 10% of the national population and close to 1/4 of the entire 1980 urban population. This disadvantaged group also constitutes the majority of those referred to as urban poor. Thus, no amount of legal and technical nuances could adequately disguise the fact that the issue of land availability is at the heart of the slum and squatters problem. With some known exceptions, urban poor occupy land illegally because they cannot avail of the legitimate alternatives offered by contracts of lease or usufruct, much less ownership, or any of their variations. This obvious absence of other options is further constricted by the requirement of having to live close to their places of employment to save on transportation costs.

This particular focus of urban land reform is also a more realistic posture in the face of the legal, technical and financial difficulties encountered in keeping the rural population at

bay. Added to this is the fact that persistent exhortations to keep Filipino families small and compact have also not had any dramatic impact.

Even while recognizing that a comprehensive urban land reform program has concerns beyond delivering land for housing and urban services for the poor and should encompass all other activities that promote the planned development of urban areas, the government has accepted the fact that realistically this would properly belong to a long term goal. As it is, the program of land delivery is a major and all encompassing undertaking in itself. Furthermore, many of the component activities of urban land reform are in the hands of a number of line agencies and offices, if not in the private sector. Coordination of these activities becomes a gargantuan task, definitely beyond the puny technical and financial capability or political authority of any single agency.

Notwithstanding the existence of land use and development controls, the growth and development of urban areas in the country also depends to a considerable degree on the largely unpredictable individual decisions of property owners, developers and investors. Compared with this, the level of government intervention in the development process in the form of building or improvement of infrastructure and in offering incentives to or imposing controls on certain types of land activities as practiced both in Metro Manila and the Philippines cannot be considered high. Not only are private land development activities not effectively regulated and monitored but more critically, they are not linked and synchronized with the government's infrastructure programs. These two important functions, infrastructure development and land use regulation and monitoring, are, to start with, in the hands of separate government agencies.

The regulatory bodies do not participate at all in decision making on the nature, location and timing of infrastructure utilities so that the permits and locational clearances that they issue are not necessarily supportive of the planned installation of public works projects. This abets the situation where locational clearances are based on predominantly physical criteria such as the suitability of land for the particular development applied for and their conformance with urban plans, but not on their possible effect on the infrastructure plan of the

government. This synchronization of efforts could be dispensed with minimum damage if the urban plans were a product of the joint effort of both the infrastructure and the regulatory bodies and where both are committed to the basic provisions of the plan even if they implement it separately. Coordinated infrastructure planning and development regulation would maximize the social, economic and physical benefits arising from private individual decisions and the permits issued in response to such application. In the face of the country's limited success in the planned development of urban areas which would indirectly but certainly increase the chances of making reasonably priced land available at the critical time that they are needed, the government is compelled to take other routes, some of which are not as acceptable as urban planning.

These circuituous forms of government intervention aim not only to increase the "land stock" but also to prevent its possible decrease, insofar as their availability to their target beneficiaries is concerned. In the first category are the tax on idle land which seeks to "flush out" hoarded land, and the special assessments tax for public improvements which collects unearned increments and helps provide funds for future capital improvements. In the latter category of government intervention to at least prevent reduction of land stock are rent control laws, the freeze of land prices in selected areas and the prohibition of ejection of particular types of urban tenants. All of these measures are prompted by urban land reform objectives to "defreeze" hoarded lands, to place urban lands within easier reach of the urban poor and to ensure that windfalls in land values accrue to the government through whose efforts they have come about.

This is not the time and place to discuss the merits or demerits of these legislative issuances or the extent to which these measures have succeeded or failed in achieving their desired objectives. Suffice it to say that the government has long recognized the imperative for urban land reform in the country, although it had done so in a piecemeal fashion and in the absence of an overall framework of a national land policy. Suffice it to clarify that the so-called Urban Land Reform Act of 1978 although of recent vintage is actually the culmination of decades of experimentation where the government has realized that physical, social and economic impact is greater where related

policies and programs concerned with the acquisition, management and disposition of urban lands are implemented based on a national urban development strategy.

Land Acquisition and Delivery: The Early Beginnings

Expropriation as a tool for land acquisition, together with police power and taxation are considered inherent powers of the State necessary for its survival. The Philippine Pre-World War II Constitution of 1935, and the subsequent ones promulgated in 1973 and 1986 had therefore assumed that the power of eminent domain existed and therefore simply guaranteed the compliance with the requirements of just compensation and acquisition for public use. Rural and urban land reform were deemed authorized in the 1935 Constitution in two places, aside from the general provision on social justice. The first is in the Bill of Rights which provides in very broad terms the authority to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. The second is in a separate section where Congress could upon payment of just compensation, direct the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. This provision was improved in the 1976 Constitution by adding the word "deserving" to qualify the entitled individuals. On a number of occasions, the government had used the latter provision to direct the compulsory acquisition and redistribution of private lands to urban squatters.

However, the way the Supreme Court had responded to such attempts, had in effect, as one legal expert lamented, limited rural land reform, and for practical purposes, rendered urban land reform constitutionally impossible. The reason was that the Court required "public use" to be clearly demonstrated. Furthermore, this criteria of public use was given a very restrictive interpretation by the requirement that not only the size of the land to be subdivided but the number of people benefited and the extent of the social and economic reform, should be considered. These court decisions had been highly criticized because the clause "to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals" was, in itself, a declaration of public use and was supposed to do away with the need to further prove public use. From the

proceedings of the Constitutional Convention is also evident that the Convention did not support the court interpretation that the clause applied only to landed estates with extensive areas, especially those embracing whole or large parts of towns.

Fortunately, this legal perception has since then been replaced by more liberal views in keeping with the changing concept not only of land but also of property ownership in general. Land, at least in theory, was no longer to be regarded as ordinary commodity to be traded and transacted on. Instead it has to be treated as a valuable resource held on stewardship basis. Property ownership has likewise been accepted by the more enlightened sector as impressed with a social function to be used not only for the benefit of the owner but of the community as well. The term public use has also undergone a broader interpretation and has been held synonymous with public benefit, public utility, public advantage, public convenience and public interest. All of these auger well for the use not only of this traditional power of expropriation but of alternative forms of land acquisition, including land readjustment thus making urban land reform a more distinct possibility.

Thus, more recently, the court has rejected the doctrine adopted in earlier cases which placed undue stress on property rights. It held that provided that the legislative body acted reasonably and with due regard to the requirements of just compensation, public use, due process and equal protection, it was empowered to direct that substantial tracts of urban land be expropriated for redistribution to occupants.

Compared to private lands, public lands have provided the squatters better security of tenure. Insofar as public lands were concerned, the policy appeared to be a "de facto" acquiescence. In these areas, large scale clearance projects have been accompanied with relocation programs. Due however to almost total absence of planning of these sites which therefore lacked urban services, employment opportunities and adequate transportation facilities, and their physical distance from places of work, the squatters have generally drifted back to the city to resume their illegal occupancy of the same or other available sites.

Subsequent government policy directed that tracts of public land be subdivided, certain basic services introduced and titles awarded at cost to the occupants. Not all of the laws en-

acted to implement this policy have been implemented. In the meantime, the government's attitude toward squatters had continued to see-saw from being protective (sometimes amounting to downright coddling) to being harsh, to the extent of considering their occupancy as criminal act punishable by law. In the end however, the government, notwithstanding its declaration that no Filipino should be a squatter in his own land, enacted a law making squatting an illegal act. Even much earlier, the Supreme Court, rendering a decision during the period when private property rights were held sacrosanct declared that the illegal construction of squatters were "nuisance per se" which could be summarily abated. Ejectment of squatters or even their relocation, in effect, removes so much of the lands already in the hands of this disadvantaged group and in which they are already comfortably settled. These are the situations which need to be reconciled with the urban land reform objectives which, as earlier mentioned, seek to at least maintain, if not to increase the lands available for housing and urban services.

Present Issues and Future Prospects

This was the backdrop against which the Urban Land Reform Act of 1978 saw light. The Act was a logical culmination of efforts that built up from the early pre-war years when the government preoccupied itself with the acquisition of land for building homes to accommodate both the middle income and the low income group, to the time when financial constraints and the burgeoning problems of the urban poor compelled it to concentrate its efforts on the more disadvantaged sector of the population and down to the present time where the target beneficiaries have been positively identified as the lower 30% of the urban poor.

The Urban Land Reform Act is also the culmination of a long journey which had viewed squatting and slum dwelling in varying light, where in some cases, government policy had in effect reduced the pool of land resources available to this sector of the urban poor or in fact delivered land which did not enhance or promote their well being. The jubilation that attended the enactment of P.D. 1517 has therefore been confirmed to be premature for, among others, the squatters and slum dwellers were excluded from the benefits of the law

which was supposed to increase the opportunities of the urban poor to own lands. Fortunately, this has since then been corrected by the Constitution of 1986 which identifies the homeless and the disadvantaged as the beneficiaries of urban land reform. The 1986 Constitution has furthermore underscored the focus of urban land reform as that of housing, basic services and employment opportunities.

The Urban Land Reform Act of 1978 was also enacted after various circuitous forms of government intervention to increase, if not to maintain existing land stock and to "catch" increments from public works improvement have had limited success. In many cases, the unexpected or unforeseen results arising from them negated whatever gains had already been achieved. A good example is the Rent Control Law which sought to keep certain types of housing within the easy reach of the lower income group through a system of either regulating the increase in rental or by freezing rent at certain rates. Preliminary studies have shown that this has resulted in some kind of "backlash" where prospective landowners have been discouraged from going into investments in housing for lease purposes or have, in fact removed, whenever the opportunity presented itself, their apartments or residential structure from the market. There have even been many reported cases of ejectment of existing tenants under all kinds of use in order to allow the landlords to lease them out for higher rates.

Unfortunately, the enactment of the Urban Land Reform Act has become anti-climactic in this extended period of experimentation. For various reasons, it has not had the benefit of the knowledge of the status of the earlier piecemeal attempts at reforming the urban land situation. If it did, it would have found the following:

First — That a national urban land strategy which could take off from the national physical framework plan would be needed to fill the gap for an overall framework for development of urban areas. This becomes most urgent in the light of the recently launched Comprehensive Agrarian Land Reform Program (CARP) of the government where not only agricultural lands but also lands found suitable for agriculture are covered. Most of the latter types of land are in the urbanizable parts. This strategy should include policies on the phased development of urban areas, in-migration, urban land conversion and the decentralization of indus-

tries and tertiary services. There are existing policies on these. They only need to be improved upon and linked in a more functional manner.

Second — That the private landowners have, through the years, been neglected, if not silent partners in all the grandiose plans for urban land reform. They have been passive and “reactive” subjects instead of active participants in the program. The government has in many cases, put them on defensive position instead of accorded being the privilege of helping out their disadvantaged neighbors; and that if the government looks around it will find a number of “urban land innovators” among the private sector, waiting to share their valuable experience.

Third — That the government would have to put an end to the ad hoc manner in which it had so far dealt with the slum and squatting problem. The government has to deal with it in a more decisive and consistent manner which will prevent such situation as where, on the one hand, it penalizes squatting and, on the other it allows the expropriation of private properties for socialized housing.” This term encompasses slum clearance, resettlement and relocation of squatters and slum dwellers.

Fourth — That a more positive way of confronting the illegal occupancy of private and public lands is to formulate a comprehensive Land Resources Management program which, while it exhorts more responsible land-ownership (through among others “defreezing” hoarded lands or at least protecting lands from unwanted invasion), offers incentives to attract owners into joint ventures with the government, to activate their idle lands or to undertake development strictly in accordance with approved urban plans.

Fifth — That related to the above, it may be useful to likewise codify a set of rules on the obligations of responsible landownership to complement the laws on the rights and benefits of privileged landownership. This will be in keeping with the Constitutional mandate that vests property with a social function. For instance one of the more positive consequences of the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Land Reform Program (CARP) which encourages landowners to volunteer their lands for coverage under the CARP, is that the more enlightened ones are now stepping back and seriously assessing how much lands they actually need and could responsibly manage

and how much they could and should “surrender” to agrarian reform.

Sixth — That while many of the objectionable features of expropriation from the viewpoint of government have been corrected making it much easier for government to acquire lands compulsarily, the objectionable features insofar as the private landowners are concerned such as the manner and period of payment have not been resolved.

Seventh — That until the mechanics of the other modes of land delivery (such as purchase, reclamation, donation, lease-purchase, land swap and stock swap) have been clarified and streamlined, it could be reasonably expected that the government will continue to rely on expropriation as the primary means to acquire lands for urban uses.

Eighth — That notwithstanding the changes that the concepts of land, of private ownership and of “public use” have undergone, thus providing stronger legal leg for expropriation to stand on, land banking and land assembly which would involve acquiring land in advance of actual need, would have to hurdle not only financial but possibly some legal problems which should be anticipated and attended to promptly.

The above enumerated gaps could easily serve as take off points for the revisions that have long been under consideration for the improvement of the Urban Land Reform Act. All these also point out that the experiment on urban land reform is only just gaining momentum. While the modest achievements made in the past decades could easily serve as building blocks for finally completing the structure for a more progressive and responsive urban land reform program, other building blocks remain to be selected and put in place in this continuing experiment.

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MEASURING THE CONVERSION OF LANDS TO URBAN USES IN THE PHILIPPINES: RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISIONS DEVELOPMENT AS SURROGATE DATA

Ernesto M. Serote*

INTRODUCTION

Land is a finite resource. In contrast, population, particularly in the context of developing countries, continually grows. The land-man ratio, therefore, steadily shrinks.

The land-man ratio is a critical factor in maintaining the viability of the earth as man's essential life support system. Where land is a direct input in the production process as in agriculture, the land-man ratio is of utmost importance for there is a theoretically irreducible minimum size of land a person needs to survive. On the other hand, where land is merely a platform of human activities as in settlement or urban uses the per capita share in available space is infinitely flexible.

These insights, unfortunately, are not easily understood by many people including those who have the potential power to shape, regulate or control the use of land resources. The net effect is that cities and towns or settlement sites in general, are allowed to expand indefinitely outwards usually at the expense of agricultural lands.

In the Philippines, conversion of agricultural lands to urban uses is most evident at the fringes of large cities and fast growing towns, particularly Metro Manila, Cebu, Davao, Iloilo and a few other regional cities.

Certainly there ought to be a policy to deal effectively with this practice. But before an appropriate policy can be formed there must be an intelligent basis, e.g. an understanding of the magnitude and rate of such conversion.

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This paper seeks to contribute to such an understanding.

Rationale

The rationale for this type of study stems from the fact that to date, there are no serious attempts to quantify the extent and the rate of conversion of non-urban lands to urban uses. Existing estimates of the magnitude of settlement areas are based simply on certain arbitrary population density and space allocation standards. The rate of change is also tied up, more or less, to the population growth rate with the hidden assumption that every additional person is allotted his share of nature's gift—land.

As a consequence of this lack of understanding of the nature and extent of land use change, there are no definite policies dealing with urban expansion. The few policies that exist are incoherent, if not altogether contradictory. Consider, for example, the policy prohibiting conversion of prime agricultural lands to urban uses. This should curb the premature urbanization of fringe areas and at the same time encourage the in-filling of urban vacant lands. There is, however, an existing ban on new industries locating within a 50-kilometer radius from Manila City Hall. This latter policy encourages suburbanization and negates the other policy.

Objectives

It is the ultimate objective of this paper to be able to suggest certain policy measures to deal with urban expansion in general, and with the conversion of lands to urban uses, in particular. As a basis for the formulation of policy measures, an estimate of the magnitude and rate of land use conversion is attempted em-

ploying residential subdivision development figures as surrogate data. Further, implications of such land use conversion to the future land use distribution, particularly its effect on the share of non-urban uses like agriculture, forestry, etc., are highlighted before policy recommendations are made.

Methodology

In the calculation of the magnitude of lands already devoted to urban uses the land use distribution prepared by the Natural Resources Management Center (NRMC) of the Ministry of Natural Resources for the year 1977 is taken as baseline-data. The broad land use category "urban" is then distributed by region, using percentages estimated by the Ministry of Human Settlements.

The subsequent addition to total urban lands is calculated using surrogate data namely, the total hectareage of residential subdivisions approved by the National Housing Authority (NHA) until March 1981 and by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) from April 1981 onwards. Taking the total hectareage over a period from 1977 to 1985, the annual rate of change both nationwide and by region can be known.

Discussions of the implications of observed trends as well as policy recommendations conclude the study.

Scope and Limitations

This study uses residential subdivision hectareage data as a proxy for total lands converted to urban uses. This can be defended on practical and conceptual grounds. For one, subdivision developments are being regulated and monitored by a central agency, NHA then and now HSRC. This is not so with other urban land uses such as institutional, commercial and industrial. Data on these latter urban land uses are unconsolidated and are available in the different local government units.

Conceptually, residential subdivisions are the most extensive users of land among the various urban land uses. The penchant for low and medium density in most new residential developments coupled with the preference for suburban locations, has led to the outward expansion and suburban sprawl of cities and rapidly growing towns. Moreover, other urban land uses such as commercial and institutional

areas are usually included in large residential developments. Industrial uses have not increased all that much, given the small-scale cottage-industry type being promoted in the Philippines.

This study, finally is an initial attempt at quantification and it uses secondary data only. The period of coverage is also limited to 1977-1985, for this latter period saw the most vigorous government promotion of, and private participation in housing development, town planning, and zoning.

ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

Land use distribution in the Philippines

The Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has an aggregate land area of 30 million hectares or 300,000 square kilometers. The country's population in 1980 was slightly over 48 million. This gives a gross density of 160 persons for every square kilometer or conversely, each person had a gross land allotment of 620 square meters. The country is divided into 13 regions including Metropolitan Manila which is designated as the National Capital Region (NCR).

Of the country's total land area, about 48.2 percent was classified as alienable and disposable, as reported by the Bureau of Forest Development in 1983. The remaining 51.8 percent constituted forest-lands. Table 1 shows the land use classification figures in 1983 broken down into 13 regions.

The Forestry Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree 705) declares that lands with higher than 18 percent slope are classified as permanent forest. The Bureau of Soils estimates that 16.8 million hectares or 56 percent of the total land area of the country have slopes higher than 18 percent. This leaves a total of 13.2 million hectares to be allocated to all other land uses, including settlements and other urban uses.

As of December 31, 1977, forestlands were estimated to cover 13.07 million hectares or 43.57 percent of the total land area of the Philippines. This means that as early as 1977, 3.7 million hectares of lands declared as forest were already being utilized for non-forest purposes. This is the first hint of land use conversion at the macro scale. Table 2 presents the distribution of general land uses as of 1977.

Table 1 – Land Classification by Region, Philippines, 1983 (in thousand hectares)

Region	Total	Alienable & Disposable	Forestland		Total
			Classified	Unclassified	
Philippines	30,000.0	14,467.6	10,472.3	5,060.1	15,532.4
NCR	63.6	34.7		28.9	28.9
I	2,156.8	951.7	787.8	417.3	1,205.1
II	3,640.3	1,180.3	1,735.9	724.1	2,460.0
III	1,823.1	1,071.5	539.8	211.8	751.6
IV	4,692.4	2,138.6	2,126.1	427.7	2,553.8
V	1,763.3	1,292.9	442.8	27.6	470.4
VI	2,022.3	1,460.2	453.7	108.4	562.1
VII	1,495.1	903.4	362.3	229.4	591.7
VIII	2,143.2	1,028.0	356.2	769.0	1,115.2
IX	1,868.5	1,013.7	634.0	220.8	854.8
X	2,832.8	1,110.9	1,044.5	677.4	1,721.9
XI	3,169.3	1,244.2	1,349.2	575.9	1,925.1
XII	2,329.3	1,037.5	650.0	641.8	1,291.8

Source: Bureau of Forest Development, Ministry of Natural Resources

Table 2 – General Land Uses Distribution, Philippines, 1977

Gen. Land Use Category	Areas (in million hectares)	Percent of Total Area
1. Forest	13.07	43.57
2. Pasture/Open Land	2.03	6.77
Managed pasture	0.99	
Rangeland	1.04	
3. Marshland	0.13	0.43
4. Agricultural land	11.84	39.47
Rice	3.55	
Corn	3.32	
Coconut	2.73	
Others	2.24	
5. Fishpond	0.55	1.83
Developed	0.18	
Undeveloped	0.37	
6. Urban*	1.05	3.50
7. Others* (including statistical discrepancy)	1.33	4.43
TOTAL	30.00	100.00

*Adjusted to reconcile with land area of NCR

Source of basic data: Natural Resources Management Center

Table 3 — Land Areas Devoted to Settlements by Region, Philippines, 1977

<i>Region</i>	<i>Settlement Area (in sq. km.)</i>	<i>Percent of Total Settlement Area</i>	<i>Percent of Total Regional Land Area</i>
Philippines	10,537.98	100.0	3.51
NCR	536.14	5.09	84.30
I	1,044.22	9.91	4.84
II	444.72	4.22	1.22
III	852.38	8.09	4.67
IV	1,096.54	10.40	2.33
V	638.74	6.06	3.62
VI	1,366.86	12.97	6.76
VII	1,394.11	13.23	9.32
VIII	513.39	4.87	2.40
IX	524.29	4.98	2.81
X	845.84	8.03	2.98
XI	879.63	8.35	2.77
XII	401.12	3.80	1.72

Source of basic data: Natural Resources Management Center

The 1.05 million hectares of urban land are distributed among the 13 regions applying the percentage share of each region as estimated by the Ministry of Human Settlements (See Table 3).

As percent of gross land area, settlement lands or built-up areas in general, do not seem to have approached critical levels in 1977, both in terms of the national average and regional ratios. The exemption is obviously Metropolitan Manila (NCR) which has probably exceeded saturation point. Five other regions (I, III, V, VI and VII) had higher ratios than the national average. Of these, Region VII or Central Visayas has a run-away performance of nearly three times the national figure. This is explained by the presence in Region VII of Metropolitan Cebu which is the country's second largest urban region. Despite the presence of Davao which is the third largest metropolitan area in the country in Region XI however, the third place is Region VI (Western Visayas) with a built-up area ratio nearly twice the national average. The remaining seven regions have relatively small built-up areas.

Relative to the total arable area, defined loosely as lands with slopes lower than 18 percent, the share of settlement lands presents a different picture. Based on the earlier estimate of 44 percent arable area, the percent share of built up areas to total arable lands in 1977 shot up to 7.98. Regions with relatively small

arable areas such as Regions I, VI, VII and XI have shown larger built up areas than the national average. Another three regions (III, V, and X) are closely approaching the national ratio. Also, regions VIII and IV are not too far behind. That leaves only two regions (II and XII) with still extensive arable areas that are not threatened by land use conversion. Metro Manila's area is completely arable. Table 4 summarizes this new distribution of built up areas.

Table 4 — Settlement Lands as Percent of Arable Lands, by Regions Philippines, 1977

<i>Region</i>	<i>Arable Area (in sq. km.)</i>	<i>Percent of Settlement Lands to Arable Area</i>
Philippines	132,026	7.98
I	7,715	13.53
II	13,619	3.26
III	11,597	7.35
IV	19,239	5.70
V	8,182	7.80
VI	12,352	11.06
VII	6,252	22.30
VIII	8,095	6.34
IX	11,185	4.68
X	10,961	7.72
XI	9,948	8.84
XII	13,063	3.07

Source of basic data: Bureau of Soils

Estimates of land use conversion

As explained in Scope and Limitations, the extent and rate of land use conversion to urban uses from 1977 onwards are estimated using the total hectareage of registered residential subdivisions. Approval of subdivision projects used to be a function of the National Housing Authority. Starting in April 1981, the function was transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Both are attached agencies of the Ministry of Human Settlements.

From 1977 to 1985 a total of 308 square kilometers had been added to the built up area. This represents about 3,000 hectares of land withdrawn from non-urban uses and converted to urban uses annually. It is reasonable to assume that the conversion is irreversible since the type of development invariably involves subdivision of raw land, servicing the subdivided lots, building on them with more or less permanent structures, and reselling them to the first occupants. A total of 4,308 such subdivision projects were registered during this period.

Inter-regional comparisons

In terms of absolute number of approved projects, NCR comes out on top with a total of 2,023. This is closely followed by Region IV with 1,040 and Region III with 553. Signi-

ficant growths were also posted by Region VI and Region XI. In terms of total hectareage converted, Region IV trails behind NCR by a small margin. The positions of Regions III, VI & XI remain unchanged.

What is the impact of this land use conversion on the share of built-up areas to total land area, nationwide and by region?

Seen from the perspective of the country's total land area, the lands converted to urban uses aggregating 308 sq. km. hardly make a dent in the pattern of land use distribution. This only pushes up the share of settlements to total land area from 3.51 percent in 1977 to 4.5 percent in 1985 or a full one percentage point over a period of 9 years.

Equally seemingly insignificant is the impact on the share of build-up areas to total arable lands. When the total hectareage of converted lands is added to the 1977 figures and this new sum is divided by the area of arable lands, a change in the percent share of settlement lands from 7.98 percent in 1977 to 8.22 percent in 1985 or an increase of 0.24 percent is observed.

Among the 13 regions, only regions IV and III posted increases twice that of the national average. The rest had insignificant performances except for regions VI and XI which showed increases almost the same as the national performance. Of course, NCR again is the run-way leader with an increase in percentage points 65

Table 5—Registered Subdivisions by Region, Philippines
1977-1985

Regions	1977-1980		1981-1985		Total	
	No.	Area (ha)	No.	Area (ha)	No.	Area (ha)
Philippines	1760	17,077.24	2548	13,803.03	4308	30,880.27
NCR	797	6,152.3	1226	3,357.03	2023	9,509.33
I	24	126.23	57	110.53	81	226.76
II	7	71.35	22	95.69	29	167.04
III	288	3,039.98	265	1,692.4	553	4,732.38
IV	398	3,179.4	642	5,947.04	1040	9,126.44
V	23	267.14	33	229.42	56	496.61
VI	83	1,973.6	93	978.08	176	2,851.68
VII	41	447.25	49	169.48	90	616.73
VIII	9	170.84	15	51.14	24	221.98
IX	10	61.83	13	86.75	23	148.58
X	12	245.16	8	65.41	20	310.57
XI	45	940.95	102	811.61	147	1,752.56
XII	23	500.41	23	218.42	46	718.87

Source of data: Human Settlements Regulatory Commission

times that of the national average. Table 6 shows a comparison of settlement lands as percent of arable lands in 1977 and 1985 and the increase in percentage points. The arable land area for NCR is the same as the region's total land area.

Some explanations for observed trends

If residential subdivision development could be used as a proxy for total conversion to urban land uses as this paper is trying to argue it could further be used as an indicator of private capital accumulation. Then it can be concluded from the data presented in Table 6 that there is a very high degree of concentration of private capital investment and, for that matter, the magnitude of land use change is most extensive, in Metro Manila and the two adjoining regions (Region III, Central Luzon and Region IV, Southern Tagalog). This is of course consistent with the traditional and continuing role of Metro Manila as the primate city and the regions contiguous to it as the catch basin for its growth overspill.

In terms of population Metro Manila has nearly 10 times the population of Metro Cebu and over 15 times that of Metro Davao, the next two largest metropolitan centers. Relative to the country Metro Manila accommodates 12 percent of the national population and yet its share in the national land area is a mere 0.2

percent. The 1980 gross population density of Metro Manila is 9,317 persons for every square kilometer compared to 160 for the whole country. Data presented in Table 6 also suggest that Metro Manila's built up area is now way past saturation level.

It is inevitable therefore that the adjoining regions benefit from the growth overspill of Metro Manila. In a separate study by this writer, it was found that within the adjoining regions of Regions III and Region IV the extent of land conversion seems to be concentrated in the provinces immediately bordering NCR namely, Bulacan in Region III (north), Rizal (east), Laguna (south) and Cavite (southwest) all in Region IV. All four provinces have nearly the same number of approved subdivisions as Metro Manila and account for a much larger total hectareage of converted land. All together, they account for nearly two thirds (64.7%) of total subdivisions approved for Regions III and IV.

Similarly, the idea of "overspill" is best dramatized by figures obtained for the four provinces. In Bulacan, nearly three-fourths (73.7%) of all subdivisions are located in six municipalities closest to Metro Manila. In Rizal province, 85.8 percent of all subdivisions are concentrated in six towns abutting the eastern boundary of Metro Manila. In Laguna, full two-thirds (67%) are accounted for by five bordering towns and in Cavite

Table 6 — Settlement Lands as Percent of Arable Lands, 1977 and 1985

<i>Region</i>	<i>Percent Share, 1977</i>	<i>Percent Share, 1985</i>	<i>Difference Percentage Points</i>
Philippines	7.98	8.21	0.23
NCR	84.30	8.21	0.23
I	13.53	13.56	0.03
II	3.26	3.28	0.02
III	7.35	7.76	0.41
IV	5.70	6.17	0.47
V	7.80	7.87	0.07
VI	11.06	11.27	0.21
VII	22.30	22.40	0.07
VIII	6.34	6.37	0.03
IX	4.68	4.70	0.02
X	7.72	7.75	0.03
XI	8.84	9.02	0.18
XII	3.07	3.13	0.06

province 75.3 percent are located in four towns near the south western frontier of NCR (Serote, 1985).

Outside Luzon, the only urbanized regions that appear to be growing in their own right are Western Visayas (VI) and Southeastern Mindanao (XI) with the cities of Iloilo and Davao as their respective locomotives. Central Visayas (VII) has exhibited a sluggish growth but on account of the already sprawling growth of Metro Cebu it seems to have reached a high percentage of built-up area which is nearly one-fourth of total arable lands.

Implications of observed trends

If the trends are allowed to continue the following repercussions can be anticipated in the foreseeable future:

1. Metro Manila will literally choke in the near term if all available open spaces are appropriated for building.
2. The rich agricultural lands of Bulacan, Cavite and Laguna may no longer be able to resist the pressure of urbanization.
3. The remaining regions, except Region VI and Region XI, having no major urban growth centers of their own to propel their economy to self-sustaining growth, will continue to stagnate.
4. In the process of conversion to higher category of land uses, agricultural lands invariably lose out to urban uses. Agriculture, on the other hand, tends to encroach upon marginally productive hilly forest areas. This situation is acutely felt in regions with limited arable areas like Ilocos and Central Visayas. The net effect is a misappropriation of land resources: fertile agricultural lands are utilized for activities that do not require soil fertility, marginally productive upland areas come under cultivation, and forest cover continues to dwindle in size (Revilla, 1986).

The above scenario will only strengthen the existing inter-regional disparity on one hand, and may unnecessarily misappropriate vital land resources needed for agriculture as well as open spaces needed for ecological balance for building purposes, on the other. Certainly no one would want to see these predictions happen if something can be done to avert them.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy measures

To confront the problems cited above, a strong political will is needed to implement a coherent land policy. This paper cannot do anything about political will but it shall attempt to present a coherent land policy.

To begin with, it is about time the continued outward expansion of Metro Manila is put to an end. This can be done by simultaneously limiting growth in the urban fringe and encouraging growth within the existing metropolitan boundary. Regarding the second face of this two-sided strategy a number of options may be tried:

1. The proposed Metro Manila Development Authority if it would be created should acquire extra-territorial powers to exercise planning and regulatory rights over the areas immediately adjoining the metropolitan boundary.
2. The Authority may have to purchase compulsarily the adjoining lands for easier planning and control.
3. Short of taking private lands, the Authority may apply a compensation scheme for owners of lands in the urban fringe who voluntarily maintain the open character of their properties or otherwise devote them to low-intensity urban use.
4. The HSRC should make sure that henceforth no new subdivision development shall be allowed in the provinces and municipalities bordering on Metro Manila except when these are located within the existing urbanized limits of such municipalities or when they form part of the delineated urban growth corridors.
5. The 50-km. ban on new industries should now be repealed and in its place, anti-pollution devices should be required of, or strict performance standards should be imposed on all industrial firms.

On the second aspect of the strategy, that is, to encourage concentration of growth in the existing urban limits, recent trends tend to pinpoint in this direction. There is a growing number of townhouses and residential condominiums located in the inner core of the metropolis-Manila, Quezon City, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan and Pasig. Of course, the outer

areas of the metropolis continue to accommodate low-density residential developments (Serote, 1985).

To further encourage the concentration of growth within the metropolitan limit and at the same time recover and maintain a healthy balance of open space (about 20%-25% of total land area of the city should be kept open at all times for ecological balance) the following measures maybe undertaken by the Metropolitan Development Authority in cooperation with the local government units:

1. A continuous inventory of vacant urban lands should be conducted so that these may be given higher priority in development than outlying open lands.
2. A continuing assessment of structural and environmental quality of inner city areas should be made in order to determine which blocks and sections of the city should be treated with urban renewal and rehabilitation schemes. This will regain and maintain the attractiveness of central areas and will counteract the outward suburban drift of the population.
3. As far as practicable preference should be given to medium and high density residential developments (townhouses and condominiums) over single detached large-lot subdivisions to preserve the much needed open space for ecological balance.
4. The coverage of the Urban Land Reform law should not be limited to a few urban land reform zones and 245 Areas for Priority Development (APDs). The law should also include inlying vacant lands and outlying open lands within the metropolis for better planning and control.
5. Private property owners in the city center who have the capability to undertake redevelopment of their areas must be encouraged and assisted provided that individual improvements conform with the desired standards for the entire block or the whole community.

The second set of policy measures deals with the problem of stagnation of the other regions of the country. Given a stronger policy to limit the growth of Metro Manila it should be relatively easier to implement a policy of inverse discrimination in favor of depressed areas. Public sector investment in the metropolis

should be gradually decreased and this should be diverted to and increased in selected regional growth centers.

The current thrust of the new government is rural development. This means that there will be a massive infusion of public investment in the countryside over the next several years. It is hoped that such investment will also benefit the regional urban centers particularly in regions II, VII and XII. Unless regional urban centers of sufficiently high level of urbanization and complexity to serve as factor and product markets are developed, no amount of investment in rural development will be able to propel the lagging regions to self-sustaining growth. Hand in hand with rural development therefore, there should be development of regional cities as locomotives of growth.

Lastly, a strong and vigorous land use planning and regulation is needed to ensure, among other things, that urban land uses are confined to areas with marginal natural fertility in order to keep agricultural and forest areas as such.

Suggested areas for further study


This paper may have raised a number of issues which could not be addressed adequately, given resource constraints. The simple objective of this paper namely, quantification of land conversion to urban uses as a basis for policies dealing with urban expansion has been achieved by the use of surrogate data. Although the analysis and conclusions reached are reliable enough under the circumstances, more confidence in the results could be gained by doing an actual inventory of lands converted to urban uses including residential, industrial, commercial and institutional.

Within the residential-use category, no attempt was made to calculate the share of residential developments put up by individual families outside subdivision projects. Although this latter type of residential development may not be as extensive as subdivision projects, it does contribute to total land conversion. This should be given due consideration in any future attempt at quantification.

Finally, the feasibility of utilizing only lands with marginal fertility for urban development in order to preserve agricultural and forest lands, and the search for appropriate strategies to attain this objective are some of the more interesting and challenging areas of study in land use planning.

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THE PHILIPPINE HIERARCHY OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS AND THE GROWTH CENTER STRATEGY: LIMITATIONS AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Arturo G. Corpuz

INTRODUCTION

A hierarchy of human settlements, according to a 1985 colloquium on National Physical Planning, is needed in order "to achieve a more rational geographical distribution of population and socio-economic activities."¹ This rationale was maintained in the National Physical Framework Plan (NPPF), drafted in the same year, which specified a pyramidal hierarchy of five levels—metropolitan, regional, subregional, major urban, and minor urban. The first level was intended to serve the three principal island groups; the second and third were intended to serve at the regional level, the fourth and the fifth at the provincial level:

- I **Metropolitan Centers** (Manila, Cebu, Davao).
- II **Regional Centers** (seats of regional administration, e.g. San Fernando, Pampanga).
- III **Subregional Centers** (no administrative functions but with complete range of urban services and facilities to support regional centers, e.g. Angeles, Iligan, Jolo).
- IV **Major Urban Centers** (trade centers of resource frontiers and nuclei of other leading development areas, e.g. Vigan, Bacolod, Surigao).
- V **Minor Urban Center** (agricultural service centers, e.g. Agoo, Catbalogan, Marawi).²

¹Colloquium on Perspectives for National Physical Planning, "Working Sheets for NPPF Formulation," p. 10.

²National Land Use Committee, NEDA, National Physical Framework Plan, 1986-2000, (NPPF) pp. 2, 45-51.

The implementing framework adopted for the NPPF hierarchy, following the Ministry of Human Settlements in the 1970s, was a strategy of "concentrated decentralization," specifically the growth centers as spatial foci of public and private investments and other development resources. These, in turn, are expected to generate corresponding development activities—the so called "spread effect"—in peripheral regions.

Growth centers were selected on the basis of population potential, accessibility, centrality, and availability of basic services and facilities.³ Presumably, their selection was also guided by the geographical and politico-juridical considerations mentioned earlier for the hierarchy of human settlements.

Essentially, the formulation of the NPPF hierarchy and the adoption of the growth center strategy were intended to seek balanced distributions of population and economic activities. The rest of this paper will look into some of the theoretical, political, and planning implications of the hierarchy and the growth center strategy.

THE HIERARCHY OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

Perfectly-balanced distributions of population and economic activities are obviously impossible. Even hierarchical distributions, however, cannot be empirically and absolutely defined; the magnitudes of settlements cannot be fixed because they vary according to specific, historically-fashioned social and technological norms. This is apparent from the various

³NPPF, p. 43.

prescriptions on settlement population sizes—from classical city-states to the barangay-based pueblo in colonial Filipinas—which have been offered throughout history. What hierarchies of human settlements imply, rather, is that there are tolerable degrees of imbalance and that these can be considered “more rational” than other, usually existing, states of imbalance.

Unfortunately, there is also no enduring, empirical basis for specifying tolerable states of unbalanced population distributions. We cannot really say, for example, following the logarithmic order of the rank size rule, that Cebu, as the second largest city in the Philippines, should be one-half (or any other fraction, for that matter) as large as Manila. Ultimately, therefore, a hierarchy of human settlements is ordinal-based. It is aimed towards alleviating a relatively—or an arbitrarily—referenced condition of imbalance towards yet another arbitrary, but lesser, state of spatial disparity.

The historical specificities which influence the prescription of hierarchy of human settlements remind us that a hierarchy cannot be based on a purely technical set of criteria. The political implications of the hierarchy, apart from other social considerations, also need to be considered, even viewed as inseparable and intrinsic facets of the hierarchy. This is particularly relevant considering the government policy of “planning from below.” This policy has been mentioned profusely since the ouster of Marcos in 1986 and it has been conspicuous in various public statements upholding a grass-roots, bottom-up or democratic approach to planning.

One important political issue is the consistency of “planning from below” with the NPPF hierarchy of human settlements. With the designation of subregional growth centers at the central, national level, in the NPPF, it can be argued that local planning inputs, the essence of bottom-up planning, have been summarily curtailed. One can further argue that the hierarchy discourages local planning in municipalities not identified as growth centers because these have already been declared, in effect, non-priority development areas. For the opposite reason, planning within municipalities or cities identified as growth centers may also be hampered by an overreliance by local planners on national development intentions. Complacency

may be nurtured by the perception that a growth center label guarantees or automatically channels present and future resources into the identified localities.

The incongruity between the existing NPPF hierarchy and the bottom-up planning approach espoused by the government is particularly evident in the preemptive effect of the hierarchy on the formulation of Regional Physical Framework Plans (RPPFs).⁴ Each RPPF includes a Regional Settlements Plan, an “implementation instrument” intended to show “the hierarchy of human settlements in the region, indicating primary, secondary, and lower level centers.”⁵ Adhering to the policy of “planning from below,” the Regional Settlements Plan is a logical predecessor and input to the national hierarchy of human settlements and not the reverse, which would be the case if the 1985 NPPF hierarchy is maintained.

It should be emphasized that the foregoing observations do not question the internal merits of a hierarchy of human settlements. They question, rather, its consistency with the government’s professed bottom-up planning approach, particularly the lack of regional and local consultation in determining growth centers. They do not rule out compatibility with other national planning policies, especially those utilizing a more centralized or even an authoritarian approach.

In a sense, the NPPF hierarchy represents some of the convolutions which have plagued public planning in the Philippines. Not only is the top-down manner through which the hierarchy was specified problematic with respect to the policy of bottom-up planning, but even if the two are reconciled, the limited extent to which the government actually

⁴RPPFs are documents intended to translate regional development policies into spatial strategies in order to: a) “effect a rational distribution of the regional population; b) facilitate access by the regional population to basic services; c) guide public and private investments to ensure optimum and sustained use of natural and man-made resources; and d) safeguard and protect the integrity of the physical environment.” Each region is expected to complete its RPPF in 1990. “Guidelines on the Formulation of the Regional Physical Framework Plans,” p. 2.

⁵“Guidelines on the Formulation of the RPPF,” p. 17.

allows or encourages local initiatives and fiscal management seriously inhibits genuine grassroots participation.

THE GROWTH CENTER STRATEGY

The relevance of the NFPF hierarchy may be further evaluated through a review of the growth center strategy, its implementing framework. The strategy, as mentioned earlier, requires the allocation of development resources to specified urban centers in order 1) to promote a balanced distribution of population and economic activities and 2) to induce development in the periphery.

The strategy was very popular in the 1960s although it has since then been the subject of much criticism. It is somewhat surprising that the growth center strategy continues to be recognized as a major planning strategy in the Philippines even as the majority of the countries which adopted it in the 1960s and early 1970s have already questioned and even rejected it.⁶

Consider briefly the criticisms raised against the growth center strategy based on the experiences of countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America:

- a. The growth center strategy has a dismal success record. There is little evidence that it has generated spread effects. Growth center investments have had very limited labor-absorptive capacities, having favored capital-intensive industries. The objective of increasing manufacturing employment has not been attained even as an unintended or unproportional growth in the tertiary sector has resulted.
- b. Private enterprises do not necessarily locate in specified growth centers. Decentralization is often compromised or simply does not occur.
- c. The identification of areas as growth centers and the exclusion of others have poli-

tical implications which may adversely affect the implementation of the strategy.

- d. The growth center strategy, as conceived in the 1960s, was based on western experiences which differ substantially from those of the Third World. The latter is more primate city-oriented, has more monopolistic economies, and has a much lesser capacity to invest in designated growth centers. The strategy, in short, assumes the growth and structural stability of the west when these are precisely among the objectives in less developed countries.
- e. Ideologically, the growth center strategy contributes to the maintenance of dependent relationships between less developed countries and the industrial powers. It facilitates multinational investments which may have anti-nationalist repercussions. When extended and integrated into a global hierarchy, the strategy rationalizes the subordinate status of a developing country to the world's dominant economies.⁷

Perhaps more damaging to the credibility of the growth center strategy are questions which have been raised about its purported theoretical foundation, those which dispute it as the logical, spatial extension of the growth pole concept. It should be noted that the original meaning of "growth pole" (pole de croissance), as conceived by Francois Perroux in the 1950s, was a "propulsive unit in a given environment." A propulsive unit (l'unité motrice), in this case, referred to a firm or set of firms. As one writer has noted, Perroux's propulsive unit, which is a sectoral or functional unit, was inadvertently interpreted to refer to a spatial unit. It was almost inevitable, given this interpretation, that "growth pole" became known as "a spatial agglomeration of related industries." Eventually, its original, virtually unintended spatial dimension became even more dominant, leading to the notion that a "growth pole," to cite a fairly representative definition, was "a growing urban center inducing growth in its surrounding hinterland." Meanwhile, "growth center" was substituted for "growth pole," thus completing

⁶See, for example, Michael Conroy, "Rejection of Growth Center Strategy in Latin American Development Planning," *Land Economics* 49 (1973) pp. 371-80; Niles Hansen, "An Evaluation of Growth Center Theory and Practice," *Environment and Planning* 7 (1975) pp. 821-32; UNCRD, *Growth Pole Strategy and Regional Development Planning in Asia* (Nagoya: UNCRD, 1975).

⁷Hansen, p. 822; Conroy, pp. 373-374, 378; UNCRD, pp. xii, 214-217.

the transformation of an economic growth concept to a spatial development strategy.⁸ Given this questionable evolution, including what appears to be an unsubstantiated assumption that what is true for a function-based growth pole is applicable to a spatially defined growth center, it becomes even less surprising why the growth center strategy has failed.

As far as alternatives to the growth center strategy are concerned, a few have been formally presented although none have been offered specifically to replace the growth center strategy in the NPPF hierarchy. The alternatives include strategies which: focus on specific sectors (housing, for example, in the case of Colombia); invest directly on specific needs in specific areas and hence dispense with the "spread effect" doctrine; and advocate some form of local autonomy and agro-based urbanization.

In part these have not been fully recognized as alternatives to the growth center strategy because they are not equally cohesive concepts (except perhaps for the "single, integrated, and self-governing unit" of Friedmann's idealistic agropolis) which can be simply and neatly defined. They tend to be less sweeping or ambitious in their objectives, more obviously seen as partial responses to decentralization and development concerns.

The growth center strategy, on the other hand, lends itself easily to objectives dealing with the spatial distribution or redistribution of population and economic activities. It facilitates the conceptualization of a comprehensive morphology for a simple but elegant human settlement system. It is, all at once, a description of as well as a prescription for the location of urbanization and industrialization. In this sense it is a development strategy that is easily packaged and adopted.

As it turned out, the growth center strategy, even disregarding the political and ideological issues which have been raised against it for a moment, was too extensive to be adequately implemented within the time frame with which it has been evaluated. This is why, despite the unanimous recognition of its shortcomings, the growth center strategy is

still not totally discounted. Some have argued, for instance, that the strategy has not been fully implemented to be appreciated while others conclude, perhaps more realistically and less tautologically, that it is at best only a partial approach.

Some attempts to modify or adopt only parts of the growth center strategy have led to a confused understanding of the strategy itself. This has occurred when plans or policies continue to refer to "growth centers" when, in fact, the essential elements of the original strategy--polarized development followed by spread effects--have been virtually discarded. In some cases, the continued use of the term "growth center" has prompted the use of a corollary, "non-growth centers," to refer to areas not identified as "growth centers." This is misleading because it implies that these locations are bound to stagnate.

As a whole, it appears that the growth center strategy has been passively accepted and maintained in many public pronouncements, plans, and policies, ever since it was adopted by the government in the 1970s, without the benefit of a systematic reexamination. In the process, it has been transformed to refer to a generic central place development strategy. It is used by many regional planning offices as a locational indicator of development priorities insofar as they fit the intentions of a hierarchy of human settlement systems. But the original, specific meanings of the strategy (let alone of the growth pole concept) have been clouded and barely understood.

The growth center strategy has served to promote the erroneous idea, to cite one example, that a rational distribution of population and economic activities can only be achieved through decentralization and dispersal. While this line of thinking may seem obvious for metropolitan areas, it is especially questionable for the lower levels of the hierarchy, particularly for smaller settlement clusters where some concentration may be desirable. In fact, there is no inherent positive connection between "national distribution" and decentralization.

The bottom line in the evaluation of the growth center strategy goes beyond nomenclatural issues. Other experiences are instructive here. We can cite, for instance, the Malaysian government's eventual indifference to "whe-

⁸Charles Gore, *Regions in Question* (London: Methuen, 1984) pp. 83-89.

ther it is called a growth center approach or not." It was further observed that: "Many people swear by the growth pole gospel but when the government implements it, it is not necessarily what the theorists say it should be. Various projects go on anyway."⁹

A useful reminder here is that the growth center strategy, given limited development resources, can be implemented only incrementally. It should also be remembered that the growth center strategy is simply that--a strategy aimed towards a rational distribution of population and economic activities within a hierarchy of human settlements. In the end, therefore, beyond debates on its internal merits and faults, the strategy is relevant only insofar as its objective is relevant. Because, as discussed earlier, a hierarchy of human settlements is only relatively or arbitrarily-defined, then the basis for evaluating the relevance of the growth center strategy is similarly arbitrary.

To recapitulate, it has been discussed that:

1. The government's objective in prescribing a hierarchy of human settlements using a growth center strategy is to achieve a "national distribution of population and socio-economic activities among regions."
2. A hierarchy of human settlements is ordinal-based and has no enduring empirical basis. Apart from political considerations, it is useful for conceptualizing the decentralization of social and economic relations in space. It is particularly helpful for planning the delivery of public services.
3. The NPPF hierarchy may be inconsistent with the national policy of "planning from below." If maintained, it could preempt efforts to promote planning capabilities at the regional and subregional level.
4. The adoption of the growth center strategy in the Philippines and other countries has not led to intended results.

SOME PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The following planning considerations, given the assumption that the government will con-

tinue to espouse bottom-up planning, may be drawn from the previous discussions:

- A. A hierarchy of human settlements, despite its questionable utility in previous national plans or hierarchies, is still a useful planning tool.

This observation is based on political as much as technical considerations. Apart from facilitating the planning of public service distribution (and by implication the distribution of certain private enterprises) throughout the archipelago, a hierarchy also reinforces national integration by giving equal official recognition to the metropolitan centers of each island group.

- B. The national hierarchy should be limited to three levels -- metropolitan, regional, and subregional.

At the second or regional level, regional centers may be rationalized following those of metropolitan centers at the first or national level.

At the third level, however, the designation of subregional centers requires more specific and local criteria. Development projects are best identified or rationalized at this level because it is here where the actual and direct needs of the people are best taken into consideration. But precisely because development projects already deal with specific sites and intended beneficiaries, it may be premature to influence their locations through the designated of subregional centers in the national hierarchy.

Subregional centers are still useful, however, as overall guides for development investments particularly service-oriented public sector initiatives. It is mostly for this reason that third level centers may be included in the national hierarchy.

The designation of hierarchical centers beyond the third level (as in the NPPF's major urban and minor urban centers) may be too restrictive or unnecessarily preemptive. At the present scale of the regions, fourth and fifth level centers are too numerous and too similar to serve as guidelines for locating development projects prior to the specification of the latter. (The NPPF envisions 250 major and minor urban centers throughout the archipelago by the year 2000.) In the end,

⁹UNCRD, p. 79.

specific and local comparative advantages, which may be most effectively evaluated only when a particular project or program has been drawn up, will most likely be more decisive.

- C. The metropolitan and regional centers are most appropriately identified by the central Manila-based planning office.

The present metropolitan (Manila, Cebu, Davao) and regional centers (the administrative seats of each region) may be retained. The designation of regional centers, however, should be based on the recommendations of planners at the regional level.

- D. Subregional centers are most appropriately identified at the regional level.

They should be identified as a result of and not prior to regional analyses. This fosters regional and local participation and is consistent with the policy of "planning from below."

Subregional centers may be selected based on the criteria prescribed earlier for other centers--population potential, accessibility and traffic flow, and the availability of basic services and facilities. Other positive factors include the presence of provincial capitols, retail and distribution centers of "key" commodities such as major softdrinks, fuel, and newspapers, and even the existence of Chinese Chamber of Commerce (because of their trade influence).¹⁰

- E. The growth center strategy should be dropped as an official planning strategy.

The growth center strategy has been a failure in countries which adopted it and its present utility in the Philippines is more cosmetic than real.

The argument that the failure of the growth center strategy is one of implementation does not justify its retention. Lack of implementation is also a reflection of planning shortcomings; implementation, in short, should have been an inherent consideration of the policy adopting the growth center strategy.

The argument that the growth center strategy is still useful as a partial approach is also not adequate to justify its retention. It is the key component of the strategy--the spread effect--which is in question and it would be misleading to refer to modifications which do not rely on this component as a "growth center" strategy.

The use of the term "growth center" should also be avoided. It has been used as a generic term for subregional areas which presently or have the potential to act as centers, whether political or economic, for subregional settlement clusters. This has led to some misunderstanding. Alternative terms, preferably derived in consultation with regional planning offices, need to be used.

- F. Instead of trying to formulate an explicit alternative to the growth center strategy, emphasis should be given to the basic task of translating regional development objectives into sound and implementable plans. (It should be noted, however, that these plans should, as much as possible, be consistent with national policies and guidelines.)

As mentioned earlier, identifying and planning for a rational distribution of population and economic activities are relative tasks; they deal with balancing efficiency considerations with those of equity within surrounding and shifting political and resource constraints. This means that a fixed, specific strategy may not be advisable. Sometimes an induced approach similar to the growth center's "spread effect" may be used while in other cases direct investments or concentration in a certain area may be more appropriate. At any rate, it will be the task of planners at the regional and subregional levels to define specific objectives (whether decentralization is desirable in the first place, for example) for specific subregions and sectors, decide on appropriate strategies,

¹⁰Edward Ullman, "Trade Centers and Tributary Areas of the Philippines," *The Geographical Review* 50 (1960). Among other indicators, Ullman used the existence of Chinese Chamber of Commerce to designate minor trade centers in the Philippines "since the Chinese control most of the retail trade." This is not applicable today. It is valid for wholesale trade, however, in recognition of the Chinese shift to the latter since the retail trade was nationalized in the 1950s.

and to translate these into action plans. Several planning guidelines may be considered:

1. As a general rule, the location of public sector services, infrastructure projects, and tertiary industries will be guided by the location of the hierarchical centers.
2. Resource-specific projects and investments (hydroelectric plants or dams, for example) will have limited potential locations and final site decisions will be influenced less by the hierarchy and more by actual project considerations.
3. The location of footloose industries, those with no extraordinary locational inclinations, may be guided by "bidding" processes, whether implicit (private sector and market-based) or explicit (RDC or government-initiated) or both. The idea here is that individual regional or subregional planning offices will vie, based on their regional and local development plans, for the location or for the opportunity to host these industries.

As usual, political influence will be an important factor and some locations favored by powerful patrons and agglomeration economies may emerge unexpectedly as new centers at the expense of others. This may or may not be desirable. It is difficult to avoid, however, given the monopolistic tendencies in both the policy and the economy of the Philippines. At the least, regional planners will have opportunities to define the scope and range of political decisions and, by giving due consideration to local objectives and inputs, help promote bottom-up planning.

- G. An institutionalized training program for regional and subregional planners is required if grassroots planning is to be effective.

This is in recognition of the fact that the above mentioned "back-to-basics" approach assumes that planning capabilities at the regional level, where many of the decisions will be made, are adequate. Ideally, the program should provide for the periodic review of planning legislation, administration, and other bureaucratic processes pertinent to regional planning.

These observations, as mentioned earlier, were made with the idea that bottom-up planning will be supported by the government. It has already been observed, however, that past support has been minimal and that, generally, only planning decentralization, not devolution, has taken place. Considering the instability of Philippine political and economic conditions and the concomitant need for an urgent, and hence less pluralistic, response to increasing social welfare demands, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that local planning roles will be augmented significantly in the near future. Also, since a hierarchy of human settlements requires a protracted planning and implementation period if actual urban, hierarchical linkages are to be formed, then the threat of political instability also threatens the utility of the hierarchy itself. Government succession featuring the substantial revamp of the preceding government's policies and programs, which is likely in forced takeovers, snap revolutions, and coup d'états, will certainly not be helpful, to say the least, to the hierarchy.

Given the plausibility of an authoritarian government in the future, it may be useful to recast some of the foregoing observations. In particular, there may be no compelling reason for subregional centers to be specified exclusively at the regional level. Conceivably, since planning will be more centralized, then local planning participation will focus less on decision-making and more on providing analytical inputs. This also implies that the training of planners at the regional and local levels, while it may still be institutionalized, may also be similarly reoriented. Overall, however, based on the post-second world war Philippine experience, especially during the past two decades, it appears that it is not necessarily whether government is more pluralistic or more autocratic which primarily determines the relevance and effectiveness of planning. Under both political environments, purposeful economic and physical planning have not substantially benefitted the majority of Filipinos. In the case of the hierarchy of human settlements, it has yet to move substantially beyond mere classification. ■

SHAME, INEQUALITY AND PEOPLE POWER: THE WORKING CLASS EXPERIENCE IN TATALON

Michael O. Pinches

Introduction

This paper is concerned with two issues. The first is the people power uprising of February 1986 and my continued uneasiness with the explanations that have been given for it, specifically relating to the involvement of Manila's working class. The second more general issue concerns the structure and culture of social inequality in Manila and the ways in which these manifest themselves in consciousness, interpersonal relations and political action. Thus the major question the paper addresses is as follows:— how was Manila's working class involved in the events of February 1986 and did this involvement represent an acceptance or rejection of the existing social-political order? Despite the proliferation of literature following the overthrow of the Marcos regime this question has received very little attention.

The material used in the paper is drawn mainly from research in an urban worker community in the Manila squatter settlement of Tatalon. It focuses on an aspect of social relations between the people of this community and others like them — people commonly known in Manila as the urban poor or *masa* (masses) — and the people they in turn describe as the *mayaman* (rich) or the *burgis*, to use a term popularized from the late 1960s, meaning bourgeois. Whilst the people of Tatalon sometimes distinguish other strata in Manila society, depending on the situation or issue at hand, it is this two fold division which predominates as they reflect upon themselves and others living in Manila. Thus, despite the lack of sociological clarity, and since I am here primarily concerned with the people's own imagery, I will use the

same twofold model. Elsewhere I have argued against the adequacy of the label urban poor, and have concluded that the people of Tatalon with whom I worked are best understood, both in terms of livelihood and outlook, as part of Manila's working class (Pinches 1987 (a)). Here I use the term working class, *masa* and poor interchangeably.

The aspect of social relations between rich and poor that I focus on in this paper concerns what people in Tatalon refer to by the Tagalog term *hiya*, normally translated as shame, and other derivations from this term (eg. *nakaka-hiya* — shameful; *mahiya* — to feel ashamed; *hiyain* — to shame). These words figure prominently in daily conversation about interpersonal relations. Indeed, in one tradition of Philippine sociology, *hiya* or shame is referred to widely as a key factor in understanding society and culture in the Philippines (Lynch 1973; Bula-
tao 1964; Guthrie 1968; Espiritu et. al. 1976). Although it draws attention to the importance of the concept, the normative consensus model adopted here fails to examine the structured political-economic and social contexts in which *hiya* arises or is invoked. In particular, it fails to consider the significance of shame in terms of class relations.

In this paper I argue that the behaviour and feelings denoted by the term *hiya* can act both as an expression of subordination to the prevailing social order and as a source of class resentment and action. *Hiya* is at once an element of both hegemonic and counter hegemonic processes. It is in both senses that shame and shaming are important to an understanding of working class involvement in the people power uprising of 1986.

Tatalon: The Visayan Area

Tatalon is a squatter settlement of over twenty thousand people located in the center of metropolitan Manila. Like many squatters living elsewhere in Manila, a large number of the people in Tatalon are former peasants who have left a life of rural poverty to seek out a better existence in the city. The people of Tatalon live in a number of local communities, some of which are founded on provincial linguistic ties. Families and individuals rely heavily on networks of mutual help, and it is in the local communities that these are most fully developed. The community in which I worked comprises over one thousand people. It is known locally as the Visayan Area because it has been populated mainly by Cebuanos migrating from Leyte and other Visayan provinces since the 1930s. The largest group trace their origins to the municipality of Palompon in north-west Leyte.

Whereas the great majority of rural migrants who have settled in Tatalon experience increased incomes and view life in Manila as an advancement over life in the countryside, most live a precarious existence of unstable employment and insecure residence. In the Visayan Area most workers earn a living as manual laborers in construction, manufacture and services and, though many are self-employed, about two thirds are wage-workers (Pinches 1987 (a)). As a group, the people of the Visayan Area are less poverty stricken than are some other squatter communities, yet they are most deprived than others. Their houses are mainly self-built, comprising one or two rooms constructed largely from disused timbers and galvanized iron. Though some families have television sets and other electrical appliances, they are in the minority and most have only a few pieces of furniture, usually home made or produced by local carpenters. Most people sleep on mats on the floor and where there is not enough space, bunks are often used. The large majority of families have incomes below levels officially deemed necessary for covering minimum living expenses and nutritional requirements (cf. Ibon 65, 1981: 7; Tan and Holazo 1979: 484). Most people in the Visayan Area have few clothes and other personal possessions, and income is mainly devoted to food, most of which is purchased daily. Malnutrition is common among the children and many people suffer tuberculosis, influenza, gastroente-

ritis, skin diseases and other poverty-related illnesses. As squatters, the people have also had to suffer the constant anxiety of insecure residence. All have been periodically harassed by officials and powerful real estate interests, while some have been evicted and had their houses demolished. Most houses have long had electricity usually via 'flying connections' made to a few houses metered to main supply. Over the last years of the Marcos administration, piped water was connected to many dwellings and concealed drains and concrete walkways were installed through much of the neighborhood. For those with access to them, these services are looked upon as a welcome improvement over previous living conditions, though many still have to provide their own water and drainage, while waste disposal continues to present difficulties throughout the community. Much time and energy is devoted to cleaning and trying to maintain hygienic living conditions but, for most, this is very difficult.

As in other squatter settlements, the people of the Visayan Area are not equally poor. This is evident in the differences between their houses, in the age and quality of their clothing, in the food they eat and in their expenditure on family religious celebrations. It is also evident in their schooling. The average levels of formal education are well below those that prevail in Manila as a whole, yet there is also significant variation within the community. Fourteen percent of adults have not completed primary schooling, yet about a quarter have secondary school certificates and four per cent have tertiary qualifications. The majority of parents can only afford to send their children to state schools but some are able to keep them at more expensive, more prestigious, private schools.

Since 1979, local inequalities have become more marked as many men gained relatively well paid contract work in the Middle East while many others were laid off work in factories and construction sites that came with the economic crisis of the mid 1980s. Some families have been able to build substantial well-furnished dwellings while others have suffered a decline in material living standards. Overall, the more long-standing residents have improved their incomes both through overseas contract work and through the increase of newcomers renting in the neighborhood. Nevertheless, job security is such that the

relative prosperity enjoyed by some families is often only short lived.

One of the most striking features of the people in the Visayan Area is their vibrant collective life and sense of community. Important household activities are conducted indoors but it is really only during sleeping hours that the people close themselves away from their neighbors. The focus of day-to-day life, when people are not away working, shopping or at school, is the public outdoor space — in the small clearings and alleyways between the houses. It is here where people wash their clothes, gather water, play games, drink together, engage in discussion or humorous exchange and in general pursue the activities they enjoy. The people treat regular face to face contact with those living around them as both normal and desirable. On a number of occasions individuals remarked that they found it strange and disagreeable the way in which they perceived the rich to live — in big lonely houses closed off from each other and from street life by separate bedrooms and high perimeter walls. Apart from the informal day-to-day interaction within the community, locally organized dances, Christmas and New Year celebrations, along with wakes and other such activities also draw individuals into regular group life.

The people of the Visayan Area often associate their sense of community with their common identity as Visayans or more specifically as people from Palompon, Leyte. Indeed the major community event in the Visayan Area is the annual celebration of the Palompon fiesta. However, this is not reserved for Palompongonans alone, nor even for Visayans; many others in the community, even those without Visayan kin, also participate in it as their own fiesta. Many of the people further associate their sense of community with the large number of kin most of them have in the neighborhood. Many of these relations are traced back to the countryside but most have been given social meaning in Manila; indeed some have been 'discovered' in Tatalon, while many others have been contracted there through marriage and baptismal rites (*compadrinazgo*).

Much of the significance of these relationships is to be found in mutual help: in finding work, in acquiring food, clothing and money, in borrowing household items, in conducting courtship and settling disputes, and in ob-

taining information, advice and protection. Personal relationships differ greatly in the extent to which such help is sought and given, yet there is a general understanding that residence in the Visayan Area obliges one to help and entitles one to seek help. Those who repeatedly refuse — and there are a few — tend to be ostracized. Thus the Visayan Area is also a moral community; not only is there mutual help between individuals and families, but there are also shared views on what that help should be, who should provide it and when. Such views moreover, merge with a local wisdom about the state of the world, the meaning of success and failure and the character of rich and poor in the Philippines. Particular individuals hold contending ideas, indeed debates are common and lively, but what is significant is that most opinions, experiences and information are aired and evaluated within the communal arena.

Whilst the Visayan Area expresses communal solidarity, vis-a-vis the outside world, it is also a collective vehicle through which the people come to terms with and participate in this outside world. Thus, alongside the common sense of identity and the local esteem that comes with sharing and mutual help, internal status differences are judged on the same criteria as prevailed in Manila at large. Differences in income, occupational standing, job security, educational achievement and private consumption play a big part in the way the people evaluate each other and seek recognition. In this sense the Visayan Area is co-extensive with, and a microcosm of the outside world.

Tatalon, the state and the 'EDSA Revolution'

The whole squatter settlement of Tatalon is divided administratively into two *barangays* or wards, each with its own *barangay* captain. These wards are in turn subdivided into districts, each with its own *barangay* councilor. Before the declaration of Martial Law in 1972 these were elected positions but between 1972 and 1982, captains and councilors were appointed. Government controlled elections held in 1982 saw only minor changes in the makeup and activities of the councils. Throughout this period the *barangays* functioned primarily as agents of authoritarian rule and worked closely with the police and Philippine Constabulary in maintaining control over the settlement. Whilst many people sought assist-

ance from the *barangay* officials, nearly all regarded them with suspicion and fear.

Apart from the *barangay* councils, the principal arm of Government in Tatalon is the National Housing Authority which, since 1979, has been implementing a major redevelopment scheme in the settlement. Under this scheme parts of the settlement have been subdivided and lots have been sold on a mortgage basis to long standing residents. Recently settled squatters have been evicted or forced onto other vacant sites in Tatalon. For a number of years the National Housing Authority has operated an office in the settlement and through its surveys, public meetings and distribution of notices, has had a significant impact on the people. For most of this time it has worked closely with the *barangay* councils. It has been a major source of anxiety and apprehension among the people.

The most politicized issue facing the people of Tatalon and most squatters elsewhere in Manila is land tenure. Though many of their grievances concern other matters — insecure employment, low incomes and corrupt officialdom for instance — it is primarily in relation to their status as squatters that they have been defined into mainstream political culture. Marcos, like other Presidents and political leaders before him, sought to win a popular base among the poor of Manila in reference to this issue. Indeed, from the mid 1970s the Marcos administration was more active than any of its predecessors in trying to establish control over the city's squatters. On the one hand this involved evictions on an unprecedented scale, a policy which had the support of property developers, but which aroused resentment and opposition among squatters and groups supporting them, notably within the Church. Yet the Marcos program, managed by the National Housing Authority, also involved the sale of serviced house plots on resettlements such as Tatalon. At the time of its political demise, the Marcos Government had processed or was processing the claims of many thousands of families through this scheme. Whilst the majority of squatters in Manila were not included, the programme offered some hope that in the future they might escape the insecurity and stigma of squatting. The program was carefully presented as an act of generosity and patronage by the first couple, who, on a number of occasions,

visited Tatalon and other settlements to win support and to distribute certificates of 'award'. School children were instructed to sing songs of thanks and their parents to applaud and display pro Marcos banners during these visits. Government controlled television, radio and print media broadcast the events to a wider audience. The speeches and leaflets presented on such occasions stressed the generous patronage of the first couple couched in the populist rhetoric of the 'New Society'.

When the Presidential elections were called in 1985, the Marcos Regime appeared to wield much influence in Tatalon. Both the National Housing Authority and *barangay* campaigned for a Marcos victory, various forms of largesse were offered and many people depended directly or indirectly on Marcos controlled state patronage for their livelihood. Perhaps most important, the Marcos Government's redevelopment program was welcomed by most as a relief from years of struggle over a secure place to live, despite the continued uncertainty over mortgage repayments. If nothing else, the level of intimidation that the Marcos regime had been able to instil among the people of Tatalon seemed enough to guarantee victory, especially given the apparent lack of organizational and military power available to the Aquino opposition. Indeed, once the election results were tallied, the Marcos party publicly announced victory in Tatalon, and among the urban poor generally, largely on the basis of housing and urban land reform programs. However, even official figures showed that this victory was by a slender margin and applied only to the *barangay* most affected by the redevelopment program. Taking the two *barangays* of Tatalon together, both Government and opposition figures showed an electoral victory to Aquino. In the Visayan Area, where the Government's redevelopment program had been most fully implemented, 57 per cent of voters were recorded to have supported Aquino. Given the regime's institutional powers and its record over previous elections and referendums, these results were remarkable.

More interesting than the official results however, was the mood of opposition that built up in Tatalon during the campaign period, and particularly after the election, when many, who said they had voted for Marcos, changed sides and joined the protest rallies that culminated in the overthrow of the Government. All through this period Aquino's supporters in

Tatalon had been the most vocal. It was their talk and camaraderie that dominated the public arena, along the roads, alleways and clearings. It was they who displayed most enthusiasm, good humor and confidence. Most of those who attended the Marcos rallies went for the money and other gifts available, while those participating in the anti-Government demonstrations generally paid their own way. In the election aftermath they comprised the great majority.

Not all people in the Visayan Area had taken an equal interest in the election: some remained skeptical and showed limited interest even as the mutiny by the armed forces was being staged. But increasingly, throughout the election period and during the civil disobedience campaign and protest rallies that followed, more and more people were drawn into the political arena. Keeping up with the latest news broadcasts over the Catholic Church radio station, on television, through the newspapers and by word of mouth, as relatives and neighbors returned from the streets, became a major pre-occupation.

I do not have any figures on the proportion of people in the Visayan Area present outside the military barracks and television stations where the final drama of Marcos's defeat was played out. Certainly most stayed at home, many of them fearful of the outcome. Nevertheless, I estimated that the majority of the youth in the community and a high proportion of the men joined the crowds that flocked to EDSA. Some say they responded directly to the call of Cardinal Sin and certainly a great many say they would not have gone had it not been for this directive and the large presence of nuns and priests. Yet none said this was their sole reason for participating. Many said they went out of curiosity, or because their friends and relatives were going, or simply because "everyone was there". Some went with their families, some with their friends or peers (*barkada*) from the community, and others with their work mates from outside the community. Most only stayed during the day, to come home late in the evening and, in some cases, to return early the following morning. Some, notably the young men, stayed overnight, sometimes taking their own sleeping mats and blankets, sometimes availing themselves of those brought by others in the crowd. Food was also taken and shared — often with complete strangers. In these final days, students stayed away from school and many workers took time off to go

to EDSA. Though participants from the Visayan Area always went in groups they did not congregate in any particular location but say they moved around and merged easily with the rest of the crowd. As different pockets in the crowd chanted political messages, or prayed the rosary, so people from the Visayan Area joined in. Continuing their discussion from Tatalon, some talked with their companions, or others around them, about the problems they associated with Marcos rule — high prices, unemployment, corruption, the large foreign debt and so forth. But in recalling these experiences, *the people of Tatalon lay most stress on the camaraderie, the vitality and the enjoyment of the occasion*. Many describe a fiesta atmosphere. Even those remaining at home, but keeping up with events through their neighbors and radio broadcasts, describe similar feelings in Tatalon. Once it was known that the Marcos family had left the country, similar scenes to those that occurred elsewhere in Manila, broke out in the Visayan Area and in Tatalon generally. People banged tins, laughed, danced, greeted each other and generally celebrated in a manner that they describe as being like New Year's Eve.

Politics of Shame

The involvement of people from Tatalon in the Presidential election and popular uprising of February 1986 cannot be understood simply, or even primarily, in terms of electoral politics or support for either Marcos or Aquino. Certainly the desire by many people to remove Marcos was strong; conversely many saw much appeal in the apparent sincerity and honesty of Aquino. Indeed much debate and discussion between people in the Visayan Area referred to the respective strengths and weaknesses of the two candidates. However, more fundamental than these issues are matters concerning social relations between the people of Tatalon and those they describe as the rich or *burgis*, and the extraordinary character that these relations assumed during the events of February 1986. An important dimension of these relations concerns the feelings of shame and act of shaming.

Much of the literature touching on social and political relations between different classes in Philippine society *either stresses normative consensus and reciprocity* (Lynch 1973; Hollnsteiner, 1963, 1973; Guthrie 1968; Bulatao, 1973) *or economic exploitation, political re-*

pression and conflicting material interests (Guerrero 1971; Constantino 1975; Bello et. al 1982). What one approach lacks in sensitivity to political-economy and social conflict, the other lacks in careful cultural analysis. Both generally suffer in their failure to explore the differences and tensions that are to be found between *the attitudes and social practices of dominant and subordinate groups*. There are important exceptions in the study of peasant rebellion (Kerkvliet 1979; Iieto 1979), but not so in the treatment of urban workers or the urban poor.

As I have indicated, material deprivation and economic hardship are fundamental to daily experience in the Visayan Area. They are a *constant source of anxiety and discontent*. Yet material deprivation is always mediated and given meaning through social relations. What matters most to people in Tatalon is the way others attribute or deny value to them as human beings. It is primarily in this context that wealth differences are to be understood. Indeed it is the common *burgis* tendency to portray the lives of the poor purely in terms of material deprivation that people in the Visayan Area find so degrading, dehumanizing and shaming.

For people of the Visayan Area, the feelings of shame and the act of shaming are common to the daily experience of interpersonal and interclass relations. As has been observed widely in the Philippine literature, shame is frequently used or invoked as a principal sanction in reciprocal relations, most notably in those involving a debt of gratitude (*utang na loob*) (Holinsteiner 1973; Quisumbing, 1976). The pairing of shame and debt of gratitude arises generally in interpersonal relations, but it is of particular importance in relations of patronage, including political patronage. Thus in the highly personalistic style of Philippine politics, the skillful politician is said to generate electoral support, not only through promises of patronal benevolence, but extending that benevolence — whether it be through gifts of money, employment public works or favor of another kind — in such a way as to cultivate a sense of gratitude among the electorate (cf. Holinsteiner 1963).

In many ways the martial law years saw the Marcos family try to establish themselves as supreme patrons. Thus, in Tatalon, Christmas gifts would be dispersed through the National Housing Authority or through *barangay* local

officials as presents from the first couple. Relief aid and state employment were distributed in a similar fashion. But most significant in Tatalon and the Visayan Area, was the Marcoses' use of the Government redevelopment scheme to cultivate a sense of moral indebtedness. The people of Tatalon had fought vigorously for decades to avoid demolition and eviction and this scheme, which allowed most residents to remain in the settlement, thus appeared to offer a valuable source of political support. That there was to be no state subsidy, that the people would have to pay commercial rates and that many had already paid in money and kind to Government officials and real estate operators, was downplayed as the whole exercise was elaborately conducted as an act of Presidential generosity and compassion (*awa*).

This cultivation of moral indebtedness was the focal point of Marcos' Presidential campaign in Tatalon. National Housing Authority and *barangay* officials regularly reminded people of their debt of gratitude over the "gift" of land and promised those who had not so far gained secure tenure that this would come if Marcos were re-elected. Appeals to patronal benevolence were used by Marcos campaigners in different ways throughout the country and in Tatalon these were not limited to the issue of land tenure. Government employees and local officials were also reminded of their loyalties and debts of gratitude to the first couple. For those not persuaded by these sorts of obligations, there was the cruder source of debt, established through monetary gifts distributed in the weeks and days before the election. Implicit in all of these moves, was that feelings of gratitude and the fear of shame would ensure electoral support for Marcos as the appropriate act of reciprocity.

Patronage politics undoubtedly brought the Marcos regime significant electoral support. A number of people in the Visayan Area cited a feeling of personal debt over the house plots they had been awarded or the jobs they had been given, and said explicitly that they would have felt ashamed had they not voted for Marcos. Indeed, when it was discovered that Aquino had received most of the votes, a number of local officials, visibly shaken by the result, accused others in the community of being ungrateful, of having no shame.

Conspicuous generosity, debt of gratitude and the sanction of shame are clearly not the

only elements to political patronage in the Philippines. Ultimately, the principal element is institutional power and the capacity for violence. This element was most pronounced during the Marcos years and with nearly every reference to Presidential generosity and moral indebtedness, was the veiled threat of retribution or suffering should particular individuals or communities not support the regime. Some looked upon Marcos' strength and preparedness to use force as a positive attribute, especially given the threat of civil war which the Government had played up during the campaign. Believing the opposition party to be lacking in political and military might, many people supported Marcos for primarily pragmatic reasons — they did not want to be on the losing side and risk the consequences. But this pragmatism also extended to taking a public stance of support for Marcos, but voting for Aquino.

Whilst the power of the Marcos party was seen by some as a positive attribute, nearly all people in the Visayan Area expressed ambivalence over this. For the most part, the repressive side of the regime's character worked against its re-election, once it became clear over the final weeks and days that the President's might had waned in the face of concerted opposition. For years people in Tatalon had lived in fear of the Government; some had lost their lives at the hands of the military, many had been injured, arrested and detained and virtually all had suffered harassment or intimidation of some kind. Whilst these circumstances had increased the authority of local people appointed to *barangay* office, there was deep-seated resentment among the majority of ordinary people who felt they had no choice but to endure their hardship in silence.

Common feeling in the Visayan Area was that a strong good Government was needed to prevent social disorder, but that Marcos rule had been excessively harsh. Likewise it was generally accepted that private enrichment came with high public office, but again that the Marcos family had taken corruption and extravagance to unacceptable extremes, exhausting the country of its wealth; hence the common saying among Visayans in Tatalon: "*Marcos Tikuskus*", *tikuskus* referring to someone pitifully hunched in fetal position unable to move by the pangs of hunger.

Perhaps the most deeply felt grievance against the Marcos regime was the contempt

with which the people felt they were being treated. In the newspapers, on television and radio, and occasionally at public meetings in Tatalon, they would hear passionate speeches from the Marcoses about how they intended to uplift the lot of the poor, about how they would give or had given the people the land they had longed for and so forth. But people in the Visayan Area knew from painful experience that none of this had come to pass, indeed that no serious attempt had been made to help the poor. The cost of the Christmas gifts they received were often outweighed by the bribes they had to pay Government officials, and whilst they welcomed the opportunity to win legal status in Tatalon, most had no illusions about the fact that it was they who had to pay for the land and the cost of providing water, drainage and pathways. Some sarcastically said they thanked President Marcos for his signature, that being all that he had contributed. At one Tatalon public meeting, Imelda Marcos had addressed a crowd pronouncing in dramatic tones her compassion for the poor and her pledge to give the people their land. Amidst polite clapping, one man held aloft a small pot of soil calling out simply "one pot of land (*isang pasong lupa*)."

Normally people in Tatalon would not take the risk of airing their disbelief so defiantly, but this man's actions were echoed later by others as they returned home.

Tatalon had a reputation for its militancy over the land issue and when Martial Law was declared, the settlement's activists were treated severely. Sometime later, when the Housing Authority commenced work in the settlement, it began a series of meetings which were announced as opportunities for the people to at last air their views and participate in the planning process. However, these meetings were nearly always attended by highly visible armed military personnel and were conducted in such a manner as to stifle serious debate. It was common after such occasions to hear someone remark "They are just making fools of us, (*Niloloko lang nila tayo*)". Alternatively, in more humorous tones, it was often said "Our heads are already round, still they try to make them round (*Bilog na ang ulo namin, bibilugin pa nila*)" meaning "we can already think for ourselves but still they insist on trying to confuse us". Sometimes after such statements the people would add that they could do nothing to change this because they were "held by the

throat (*hawak sa leeg*)”.

These experiences and feelings add a second dimension to the significance of shame in Patron-client relations, a dimension that is touched on only rarely in the Philippine sociological literature, namely the act of shaming. Here the issue does not concern the embarrassment and humility that are felt, or will be felt because of failure to fulfill a debt of gratitude. Rather in the instances cited, people say that the Marcoses, and Government officials generally, treat them without respect and insult their dignity, that they are shaming them (*“hiniya kami”*). These acts of shaming do not bring inner feelings of embarrassment or loss of face; rather they arouse resentment and hostility. Thus, the failure of many people to vote for Marcos had as much to do with the issue of shame as did the fact that some felt obliged to vote for him. Before pursuing further the political significance of shaming as an action, I wish to return to the first dimension of shame as it concerns the inner feelings of social inadequacy.

Shame: Structure, Symbols and Subordination

In Tatalon the feeling of shame is used to describe the painful experience of everyday life. For the people with whom I worked, the experience of poverty, hardship and subordination is not just the experience of going without; more fundamentally it is the experience of not being valued as human beings, of having to endure humiliation, disapproval and rejection, of constantly having one's dignity challenged. These feelings of shame are not so much brought about by one's failure to fulfill a debt of gratitude, or by some misdeed or negligence, rather they are inflicted from above by virtue of one's life's circumstances; they are embedded in the structure of class society.

For those denied access to status, wealth and opportunity, the institutions of inequality bring with them a sense of inferiority. Thus, in Manila's social division of labor, Tatalon people learn through bitter experience that, whilst some can live comfortably without having to work, they must work to survive. Yet they also learn through their work experience that they are expendable and can easily be reduced to destitution. Moreover, in the structure of labor relations they learn that their time is less valued than that of their bosses. They receive less

money for it, and whilst they often have to wait for hours, even weeks to be paid or to arrange a short meeting over a problem they might have, their superiors control their activities at a moment's notice.

People in the Visayan Area also contrast their own relatively low levels of formal education to those found among the people they describe as the *burgis*, and they know, when they go for a job, or have dealings with officialdom, or need medical attention or legal assistance, that they will be disadvantaged. They feel humiliated by the fact that they cannot provide for and protect their families in the same way those among the *burgis* can. They are painfully aware at Sunday Mass for example, that their children often do not look as strong and healthy as the children of the *burgis* sitting along the central aisle. And they know in all kinds of public ceremony, that it is the rich, not they, who occupy pride of place. They know that in death too, there is inequality. Should they oppose the Government, they could easily be liquidated and the media would pay them little attention, but should someone like Benigno Aquino be murdered, and this is far less likely, it would bring wide publicity. Their wakes, funerals, cemeteries and headstones too are less prominent than those commanded by the *burgis*. In short, the people of Tatalon know only too well that, in the social hierarchy of Philippine society, they occupy a position near the bottom.

On the basis of these conditions and experiences springs an endless variety of situations and actions that can bring shame. The labels of poverty, propertyless, and uncertain employment are inescapable -- they are embedded in one's speech and language skills, in one's command of etiquette and bureaucratic procedure; they are evident in the texture and usually the color of one's skin, or in the condition of one's teeth, dentures and hair; they can often be seen in one's posture and gait, or in the quality of one's attire, jewelry and makeup, in the type of food one buys, in the location of one's home, workplace and school or in the company one keeps. In Manila, both rich and poor have an acute sensitivity to these signs and symbols of human value. They represent an intrinsic part of the dominant hegemonic order and find expression in popular cinema, magazines, newspapers and books, in television programs and bill board advertising, as well as in interpersonal relations. In Tatalon the sensitivity to these

labels carries with it much pain and self-doubt, so that when people find themselves in the company of others more privileged than themselves they commonly say they feel ashamed, (*nakakahiya*).

The nature of the subordinate consciousness being suggested here cannot be understood simply in terms of signs, symbols and ideology. To a large extent it is a question of pragmatism as is particularly evident in employment. For example, a number of workers in the Visayan Area have openly rejected the industrial structure and regimental work practices established by their employers, only to find themselves unemployed and unable to support their families. Thus, most workers accept the regimentation and authoritarianism that comes with working for a boss, because they know of no viable alternative.

Furthermore, when people in the Visayan Area agree that the Philippines has to be ruled by people who are wealthy and who have high levels of formal education, they are not just internalizing a dominant value system, but are reflecting upon their experience of politics and the fact that the candidates who win need to spend a lot of money in doing so. The question of formal education is more complex. For one thing they also know that existing bureaucratic and administrative procedures used in Government require specialist skills which they do not have, but this is not all. The school system is perhaps the most insidious vehicle of domination. On the one hand it offers the opportunity for self-employment, and parents throughout Tatalon speak of sacrificing themselves so that their children can get a college degree to escape the hardship and feelings of inferiority that they suffer. For most, this is the only visible escape route and moreover, it has generally brought some success. Hence the system has credibility, and in pinning their hopes to it, most people in turn find themselves accepting its hierarchy of credentials and the logic of their collective subordination to the *burgis* since, as a group, they are never able to acquire the same educational standing as the *burgis*.

Similar processes can be found at work in the growth of consumerism in the Visayan Area. Once again, within the wider social status hierarchy that extends beyond Tatalon, human value is accorded to those who spend money on expensive consumer goods. That many in the Visayan Area have become increasingly pre-

occupied with such pursuits, is not so much simply a measure of a consumer consciousness, as it is a measure of the people's desire to win recognition, to escape the life of poverty and shame.

The structures and symbols of inequality experienced by people in the Visayan Area foster feelings of inferiority and shame, but they also foster discontent and the desire for a better life. I have mentioned so far, that this inspires many to work hard and to tolerate hardship, so that they or their children may escape their predicament through schooling or private consumer status. A second way in which the people deal with their devaluation in the wider society is through avoidance and social closure, that is by minimizing the number of shaming situations in which they find themselves, and by withdrawing behind social boundaries that distance them from the rich and give prominence to principals of solidarity and mutual help. This in large part explains the vitality and enjoyment associated with community life in Tatalon. Thus in the Visayan Area, as described earlier, one finds the contending themes of status hierarchy and egalitarianism constantly being played off against each other.

Shaming: Social Encounters and Class Conflict

The structures and symbols of social inequality in Manila engender feelings of inferiority and shame among the people of Tatalon, and though they also engender feelings of discontent, these feelings are largely absorbed in the quest for upward social mobility or through practices of avoidance and withdrawal. Moreover, in attempting to explain their disadvantaged position, most people in the Visayan Area are more inclined to attribute this to the bad luck of having poor ancestors than they are to blaming the rich or the social system. However, this is not the full picture.

It is useful, for analytical purposes, to treat the structural and symbolic dimensions of social inequality separately from the social encounters through which they are acted out. But it is also necessary to examine these encounters: it is here that we can appreciate more fully the dialectical qualities of shame. In the last section I treated the *burgis* as if they were simply passive beneficiaries of an unequal social order. This is not the case, for in general, they practice similar shaming behavior towards the people of Tatalon as did the Marcoses. Thus,

when members of the Visayan Area carry with them the various labels of poverty described earlier, it is not only their behavior that is affected. Indeed, it is largely the response that these symbols elicit among the *burgis* that is important.

The general experience of people in the Visayan Area is that the response is one of contempt, ridicule or patronizing sympathy. This is often communicated in body language — for example, through a look that fails to even recognize a person's presence, a feature of *burgis* behavior that people in Tatalon often simply refer to as "*no pansin*" (no recognition). Conversely, another important term commonly used to describe the behavior of the rich is that they are *matapobre*, meaning in general that they are snobbish, but more particularly, as the term suggests (*mata*-eye, *pobre*-poor), that they greet the poor with a mannered gaze of *condescending scrutiny*. People also speak of other more subtle body language which they interpret in a similar way.

In verbal communication with employers, officials, teachers or priests, people in Tatalon often feel that they are being spoken down to. Students often complain that they have trouble learning at school because they are too ashamed to ask questions since, when they do, the teacher scolds them for not knowing anything, or for being impudent. Through the common experience of verbal insults or through conversation they have overheard, people in the Visayan Area are also aware of a range of demeaning terminology that the *burgis* may use to describe them. Sometimes the residents of squatter settlements are simply described as *basura* (rubbish), while a student from one of Manila's most prestigious universities was once overheard distinguishing the differing attitudes of rich and poor to harsh living conditions, by likening the poor to pigs, well accustomed to wallowing in the mud. The very term squatter or *eskwater*, which describes the legal status of many residents in Tatalon, carries a strongly pejorative meaning and is used widely in this sense. Likewise, the term standby or *istambay*, which denotes someone who is unemployed, is commonly used as negative references to people in places like Tatalon. Residents of Tatalon are sometimes referred to as *palaboy* (tramp, vagrant), as *ignorante* (Ignorant) or as "*no read no write*." One of the most insulting terms of address encountered by the poor is *patay-gutom* meaning literally "dead hungry," de-

noting a person who is utterly hopeless and destitute, someone who lacks even the most elementary of human attributes. What all of these terms have in common is the denial of human dignity and valued social identity; that is, they are shaming terms.

This behavior and language is encountered in various social settings — at work, in shopping centers, churches, on ceremonial occasions and in daily encounters on the streets. However, most people of the Visayan Area have only limited personal contact with the rich, partly because of the different class worlds into which their existence is structured, and partly out of the mutual desire for avoidance. There is an apparent irony here, since whilst those in Tatalon commonly seek to withdraw from encounters with the *burgis* for fear of the shaming it will bring, one of their chief complaints against the rich is that they will not have anything to do with the poor. The important point concerns the manner in which this desire for avoidance is communicated. And in Tatalon it is the apparent arrogance and disdain of avoidance behavior by the rich that the people find so insulting. Indeed, it is more often the condescending body language and aloof manner of speaking, than the explicit terms of insult, that people in Tatalon encounter when they have contact with the *burgis*.

Nevertheless, direct abuse and ill-treatment are experienced, most frequently in employment, and though particular individuals may not have been victims, they know about such incidents through family members or neighbors who have been. Many women in the Visayan Area for instance work, or have worked as maids for wealthy families, and often tell of the humiliating manner in which they have been treated. One man, a former driver for a wealthy family, tells of not being given time off for lunch, while he had to wait for hours as his boss dined with friends in an exclusive restaurant. An electronics factory worker describes the tense occasions when her boss periodically inspected the factory floor. Before he would arrive, the woman's supervisor would warn the workers to check their attire, to sit properly and to remain quiet. Should they wish to go to the toilet they must do so beforehand. On the occasion a woman had not done this and left while the boss was on his tour of inspection. To the woman's horror and intense embarrassment her boss followed her into the toilet, then, after a short interval, came out

grinning as the rest of the workers angrily watched on. Such stories are a part of common knowledge in Tatalon.

Whilst the feelings of institutionally based shame described in the last section do not focus the people's resentment on the rich, contemptuous or insulting behavior does. Clearly, as the last example indicates, these two dimensions of shame and shaming often arise together. But it is shaming behavior, interpreted as such, that most arouses feelings of class anger. For fear of the consequences particularly during the era of Marcos rule, this anger is rarely expressed openly, but it does find expression, both in words and action. However muted these expressions may be, they form part of a tradition of protest and resistance in the Visayan Area and among the working class generally. Against the *burgis* stereotypes of the poor, the people I lived with commonly looked upon the rich as arrogant and unsociable, and were quick to condemn others in the community for behaving in the same way. In conversation they often coupled the word for rich person, with the rhyming word for boastful, hence *mayaman mayabang*. The term *burgis* itself carries the same connotation, as does the word *high-hat*, which is also frequently used to describe rich people or those emulating them. *Matapobre*, a term mentioned earlier, is likewise used as an insult to describe people who mistreat the poor, as is the term *Ipokrita* (hypocrite). Thus, just as the rich have a vocabulary that is demeaning to the poor, so do the poor have their own vocabulary to be used pejoratively against the rich. Indeed, among individuals within the Visayan Area, these two sets of terms are often played off against each other, as the principles of status and egalitarianism, spoken of earlier, come into conflict. This lends itself to remarks that may have double meanings depending on the intonation and conversational context. Hence, as someone refers to the prospect of asking a third party for assistance, they could use the term "*nahiyahiko*" meaning literally "I am ashamed", but they may also be using the term sarcastically to refer to the *burgis* character of that third party.

Aside from using these expressions and speaking critically among themselves about the behavior of the *burgis*, people in Tatalon also act out their class resentment in other ways — notably at work through go-slow labor practices, absenteeism, minor sabotage of property, pilfering and so forth. Local values of resent-

ment against the rich and employers in particular, are such as to lend community legitimacy to this kind of behavior. Being able to deceive or annoy the rich, without being caught, was often a matter of some enjoyment. For example, some children and youth in Tatalon took delight in disposing of their rubbish and excreta by throwing it into the yards of rich people who owned houses nearby.

That such attitudes and practices can be maintained at a collective level owes much to the extensive relations of mutual help and sense of community that prevail in the Visayan Area, these characteristics themselves attributable largely to the material circumstances of deprivation (c.f. Pinches 1987 (a)) as well as to the avoidance practices noted earlier. Moreover, whilst values reflecting the wider status hierarchy are deeply embedded in the community, there are also elements of a counter ideology that go beyond simple class hostility. Thus, as I mentioned earlier, people in the Visayan Area sometimes look upon features of the lives of the rich, most notably their perceived individualism, as unattractive and disagreeable. Furthermore, in advancing their criticism of the *burgis*, they commonly invoke the principle of human equality against their experience of social inequality (c.f. Jawardena 1968). Two common sayings along these lines are as follows:

"Parehong kalansay ang labas natin sa hukay. (In the grave we all come out with the same skeleton)"

"Ang itinatae ng mga mayayaman ay kasing bantot rin ng mga itinatae ng mga mahihirap (The shit of the rich has the same bad smell as the shit of the poor)"

In some contents there also emerge elements of a "subsistence ethic" (c.f. Scott 1976), but these principles do not constitute a coherent value system or world view. Rather they co-exist as part of a fragmented, largely contradictory set of attitudes, variously invoked, depending on the situation at hand. There is however a principal line of tension, as is evident in the feelings and practices surrounding the concept of shame, namely the tension between accommodation and resistance.

People Power: Shame, Inequality and Communitas

To a large extent, the response of people in

the Visayan Area to the Marcos Government, to their employers and to the *burgis* generally, has been one of cynicism, pragmatism and opportunism. Whilst daily experience impells them to accept their subordinate status and acknowledge the superiority of the rich, it also engenders in them feelings of discontent, dissatisfaction and class anger. Thus, in the absence of credible alternatives, their approach to politics has been largely one of cynicism and scepticism. This is the way in which most initially approached the Presidential election of February 1988. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Pinches 1987(a)), the circumstances surrounding the election, and in particular the emergence of the Aquino-led opposition were highly unusual and saw a significant short term changes in the social relations between the *burgis* and the *masa*.

Alongside the division of interests and sentiment between classes in Manila, the Marcos years had opened up an opposition between state and people. This became especially marked following the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983; it was not only the poor who suffered at the hands of the regime but also the *burgis*. In one campaign leaflet for example the names of squatters killed by Government troops in Tatalon were listed alongside those of Aquino and other prominent personalities killed by the regime. All had stood in opposition to the Marcos Government and all had been victims of its brutality.

The social-political division between state and people was widened further by the Marcoses' virtual monopoly over state resources and private largesse. With the partial exception of vice-presidential candidate Laurel's UNIDO party, the Aquino campaign lacked an established political organization and could not mobilize patronage networks in the way that was possible before Martial Law. Instead, Aquino had to rely heavily on the limited resources of many people. A number of newspapers provided crucial support for the opposition, but given only minimal access to the electronic media, the Aquino party had to adopt alternative methods for delivering its message. For example, cassette tapes of Aquino's speeches were distributed in Tatalon and other areas, where they were passed around between neighbors. Similarly, though many of the posters, leaflets and badges used in the Aquino campaign were mass produced, there was also evidence of more labor intensive me-

thods. Appearing on walls and sigings in various parts of Manila were posters produced from sheets of newspaper, painted over with an Aquino slogan. In other places supporters dispensed with the paper altogether and simply wrote on the walls. When the Marcos party started mimicking this, some time later, it seemed that it had lost much of the initiative. In contrast to the centralized, patronal and hierarchically ordered nature of the Marcos campaign, the Aquino campaign in Manila was characterized by feelings of popular participation, spontaneity and fraternity.

At first the alliance between rich and poor in the Aquino opposition was largely one of mutual convenience. Just as many people in Tatalon found in the moderate opposition a convenient vehicle for expressing long standing grievances against the Marcos Government, so did the more privileged in this opposition find an alliance with the poor a necessity in making up for their lack of patronal resources and an established political organization. Opposition leaders could not appeal to traditional values of patronage; they had to draw instead on popular participation and fraternity, in short on "people power." In doing so however, the opposition campaign shifted the arena of political values and debate, thereby further undermining the logic of the Marcoses' authority. Increasingly, political power seemed to rest not in structure and hierarchy but rather in commonality and communion. As opposition forces mounted in the election aftermath, participation was not just a question of common purpose, it was also one of common capacity. What mattered over the final days especially, was not so much one's attire or speech or educational skills; rather it was one's bodily presence and in that, *burgis* and *masa* appeared equal. The signs and symbols of hierarchy, inequality, poverty and subordination seemed to have lost their efficacy, and so too had shame.

The political movement that culminated in the "February Revolution" had much in common with the undifferentiated ritual state of *communitas* described by Turner (1969). For a historical moment it seemed, the Filipino people were one, the state appeared to be crumbling and the order and division of civil society seemed to dissolve as rich and poor, *burgis* and *masa*, stood together in defiance, in danger and finally in victory. Apart from those favoring the miraculous intervention argument, most commentators have explained

the mass participation in the EDSA uprising in terms of instrumental goal-oriented behavior. Filipinos had finally had enough of the corrupt dictator Marcos so they would now go to any lengths to remove him. Alternatively, Filipino voters of all persuasions were so indignant at the flagrant cheating that occurred during the elections that they were now prepared to risk their lives in order to restore electoral democracy. However, as I pointed out earlier, these were generally not the kind of explanations that people from Tatalon gave for their participation. Indeed, their accounts did not stress reasons so much as the occasion itself — the *huge crowd, the feeling of enjoyment and pride, and, above all, the spirit of camaraderie*. Although support for Aquino, the desire to remove Marcos, and the call of the Catholic Church, were important, what *mattered most were these feelings*. For a time, the EDSA uprising and the state of communities that it embodied, had enabled the people of Tatalon to command recognition, to stand in the presence of the rich without having to contend with the power of shame. It had enabled them to experience the principle of human equality, and it had enabled them to effectively act out the resentment they felt over the way they had been treated under the Marcos regime. Paradoxically though, EDSA had also elicited their renewed consent to *burgis* authority which, though diluted and vulnerable, remained undissolved in the liminal state of people power. In short, the extraordinary circumstances that marked the popular uprising of February 1986 had enabled the people of Tatalon to deal with shame in each of its contradictory dimensions; it had provided them with the opportunity both for resistance and accommodation.

Whilst the people power uprising had the highly significant effect of removing Marcos from office, in terms of the wider social — political order, *it was largely an expressive, cathartic event*. Not surprisingly the state of *communitas* has passed. Once again the structures of social inequality govern day-to-day existence, once again the symbols of wealth and poverty have gained ascendancy, and once again the power of shame intrudes into Tatalon. As one young man who participated in the barricades outside the military camps said to me:

“At EDSA rich and poor came together, but now it is like it was before — they can’t be bothered with us.”

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RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION: THE ROLE OF NACIAD AS A DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

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INTRODUCTION

Rural development is an objective of development planning shared by developing and developed nations alike. It has long been central to the development agenda of the governments of the South and Southeast Asian countries in general and of the Philippines in particular. Rural development is believed to be essential to the development of a nation in as much as the vast majority of the population live in the rural areas.

The rural development programs in general have been formulated to accelerate growth by:

- i) providing increased food supplies;
- ii) contributing to capital formation through the accumulation of agricultural surplus and enlargement of agricultural exports;
- iii) furnishing manpower for the industrial sector of the economy;
- iv) stimulating industrialization by increasing rural net cash income; and
- v) increasing social benefits such as health services, employment, and educational facilities for the majority of the population.

Nasol (1987) believes that development programs designed to alleviate rural poverty are gradually changing from the dole out, social welfare type, where the poor are merely at the receiving end, to those which espouse participatory approaches. Here, the poor take an active part in the decision-making process.

The latest approach to rural development adopted by the Philippines is the Integrated Rural Development (IRD) or, alternatively, *Integrated Area Development (IAD)*. It involves a complex process of change and adjustment in a society as a whole. At the national level, it requires reorientation of policies in order to bring about a better balance between production and distribution, an equilibrium between central guidance and local initiatives, equitable allocation of resources between urban and rural areas and a more integrated approach to development (UN, DTCD, 1980). In the Philippines, IAD has been described as a rural development strategy that involves the interactive relationship between physical and human resources and the proper utilization of technological inputs and investments. Its overall aim is to provide a framework, whereby the rural poor are able to make full use of such investments and technological innovation (Koppel, 1982). As an aggregative approach to rural problems, both in method as well as in content, it covers the widest scope of development. It is national in character and seeks to reach the poorest of the poor in the country. It is a concerted attack on the problems of mass poverty and unemployment in selected depressed areas in the country. It is envisioned that the concentration of investment in these areas through mutually reinforcing projects would stimulate and sustain growth in the local economy.

The Philippine experience in rural development, based on the IAD approach, has been marked with relative vigor, and has been increasingly recognized in recent years as a viable strategy to reinforce contemporary functional, sector-specific approaches in achieving develop-

ment targets. In essence, the IAD strategy has been conceived as a departure from traditional models of development planning and administration. Instead of focusing on sectorally-oriented schemes of service delivery, the IAD strategy gives attention to a specific geographical area in which services from various sectors are coordinated and integrated within the context of a general framework and management plan (Cariño et al, 1987). Such an approach therefore requires an organizational and administrative machinery that is not oriented toward sectoral and departmental operations but rather to area-oriented ones.

The National Council on Integrated Area Development (NACIAD), is the prime agency in the Philippines charged with the implementation of the IAD programs and projects. The creation of NACIAD seeks to institutionalize development administration by providing an effective carrier of innovative values and a machinery for accelerating economic development and mobilizing resources to attain the desired objectives. The nature of IAD programs demands a variety of administrative policies and financial and technical inputs. Coordinating and integrating these activities cannot simply be carried out by any of the existing agencies. Hence, the need for a separate body such as the NACIAD.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of NACIAD as a national rural development agency, implementing IAD programs and projects. This study traces the evolution of concepts, strategies and administrative structures for rural development in the Philippines. Then it focuses on the IAD as an approach to rural development and the role of NACIAD as a national development agency, assesses its impact on national development and its prospects for the future.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Despite all the efforts, to improve the life of the poor in the Philippines, the situation continues to deteriorate and the problems of poverty and underdevelopment still persist. It is a fact

that various organizations, government and non-government alike, continue to undertake efforts directed at curbing these problems. Nevertheless, they have failed to improve the level of living of the greater number of people in the rural areas. The policies intended to alleviate rural poverty, through increased productivity have, instead, often aggravated the problem.

The reduction in poverty, rural as well as urban, leading to its eventual elimination is a major objective of the Philippines' national development strategy in general and of the National Council on Integrated Area Development (NACIAD) in particular, which NACIAD has initiated various development programs and projects targeted towards the rural poor.

The Rural Development sector policy paper of the World Bank (1975) states that:

Rural Development is a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of . . . the rural poor. . . Since rural development is intended to reduce poverty, it must be clearly designed to increase production and raise productivity. . . It is concerned with the modernization and monetization of rural society, and with its transition from traditional isolation to integration with the national economy. The objectives of rural development. . . extend beyond any particular sector. They encompass improved productivity, increased employment . . . as well as minimum acceptable levels of food, shelter, education and health.

The strategy of rural development emerged from the desire to reduce, if not eliminate, the problem of rural poverty. As a process, rural development varies from one country to another. It depends on such factors as the particular country's stage of development; the values and capabilities of its leaders, planners and administrators; and the degree of citizen participation.

The following are the essential elements of rural development planning:

- i) involvement of people in the various steps of the development process;

- ii) coverage is multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional as it includes the economic, social, political and environmental aspects;
- iii) greater reliance on, and acceptance by rural people of the role of science and technology in improving their quality of life;
- iv) provision of equal opportunity for the rural poor to earn a living;
- v) providing in the rural areas socio-economic institutions and services that are appropriate, in effect, helping reduce rural-urban imbalance.

In the Philippines, official concern for rural development is reflected in the current Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan:

Development does not only imply economic advancement. It also means improvement in the well-being of the broad masses of people. It means getting down and reaching the poorest of the segments of the population: the urban and the rural poor, the unemployed, the homeless dweller, the out of school youth, the landless worker. . .

The goals for these groups and for the country as a whole include increased productivity for sustained economic growth, more equitable distribution of the fruits of development and total human development.

The Philippines' Asian Center for Development Administration, views the entire rural development effort as

a process which leads to continuous rise in the capacity of rural people to control their environment, accompanied by a wider distribution of benefits resulting from such control (Nasol, 1987).

Development thus encompasses institutional changes, including the distribution of the national income, knowledge and power.

Past Organizational Arrangements and Approaches to Rural Development

The national government has traditionally

assumed the responsibility for undertaking rural development programs such as agriculture, public health, education, public works and infrastructure programs. Because the economy of the Philippines heavily relies on agriculture, postwar rehabilitation efforts logically began with attempts to increase agricultural production with a view to boosting the development of the rural areas. Various approaches to rural development were adopted in the subsequent decades.

Under the administration of President Magsaysay (1953-57) and of President Garcia (1957-61), the focus of development was on the common man as the primary target of development. Magsaysay pursued a rural development program based on "equity" goals. His first plan was to come out with a management scheme conceding to some significant changes in the land reform program, particularly in funding and legislation for tenancy reform and land redistribution. His planned change centered especially on rationalizing the structure of rural development agencies by reorganizing them into divisions or bureaus in larger departments and as public corporations. In this connection, the Presidential Assistant on Community Development (PACD), a government department tasked with mobilizing communities throughout the country, was organized and set up. Magsaysay also encouraged rural communities to undertake development projects with the least dependence on the central government in the generation of local resources.

Under President Macapagal (1962-65) and President Marcos after him, rural development programs were further unified and given considerable attention both in planning and implementation.

Under Macapagal, the government gave more impetus to reformist policies on rural development. He continued the unification of agencies engaged in rural development. The organization of the Land Reform Project Administration (LRPA) was in response to a unified concept of rural development administration. The LRPA

was a single organization composed of five member agencies with one personnel pool. The National Land Reform Council (NLRC), which was the policy-making arm of the LRPA, directed, controlled and reviewed all programs, plans, procedures, policies, projects and activities of these member-agencies (CPA Research Team, 1984). This administrative unification was to precede the adoption of an integrated rural development program with a two-fold goal of equity and productivity. The result was to be the most comprehensive law on agrarian relations.

During the Marcos regime, less attention was paid to tenurial and land distribution problems of agrarian reform in favor of accelerating agricultural productivity particularly that of rice. Marcos created the Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council or (RCPCC) in 1967 focusing on information campaigns and dissemination of modern agricultural technology. Despite the centralization of RCPCC, however, not much was done to unify rural development efforts with the exception of the creation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as an "effective" instrument for pursuing equity goals. Later during Marcos' long term there was a renewed interest in tenurial change and redistribution aspects of agrarian reform, cooperative program and a rural credit program. The cooperative development strategy however, was centrally planned and implemented and showed that the Government was reluctant to delegate decision-making to the local people.

Past efforts and approaches directed at developing and improving the lot of the poor in postwar years were very weak because of the apparent absence of "political will" to push genuine rural development. Efforts were made subsequently to reorganize and reunify the rural development planning structures and processes on the basis of tightening central controls and the improvement of the flow of policy communications to the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy.

Development projects and approaches, to be effective, should be given continued support in

the form of follow-up programs, linkages with supporting groups, constant evaluations and a specific organizational entity to be responsible for such development projects. Rural development programs, moreover, must be securely anchored on the traditional institutions and cultural values of the Filipino people. Rural development furthermore, must be seen by the people as answering the problems identified by them.

Along this line the IAD approach was adopted in 1973 and served as the alternative approach to promoting efficiency and welfare in the development of the country as a whole. The role of NACIAD is of maximum importance in this regard. The IAD strategy not only calls for a strong commitment and political will at all levels but also requires the proper administrative capability to implement major development programs and projects.

From past experience, it could be noted that whereas intensified government intervention has brought about mixed benefits, these efforts and approaches have not really filtered down to the target beneficiaries. This is reflected in some of the following socio-economic indicators:

- a) wide gap in rural-urban family income;
- b) continued existence of regional dualism;
- c) high rate of out-migration, especially from backward regions to economically advanced areas;
- d) divergence in the rates of growth between the modern economic sectors (industry) and the traditional sectors (agriculture and small-scale industry); and
- e) uneven intersectoral growth rates between the commercial crop subsector (sugarcane, coconut, etc.) and the foodcrop, livestock and fishery subsectors.

Past efforts in rural development furthermore, tended to be confined within sectoral boundaries. Problems of coordination arose

which led to duplication and wastage of scarce resources. Development efforts were fragmented and the delivery of programs and services was inefficient leaving the target beneficiaries unreached.

It can be said that the IAD and the NACIAD evolved in reaction to the failure of the past approaches which were heavily piecemeal.

THE ROLE OF NACIAD AS A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

The Evolution of the IAD Approach in the Philippines

The initiation of the IAD strategy in the Philippines is a manifestation of the government's response to recent international concerns, expressed through the United Nations, for an integrated approach to the planning and implementation of the socio-economic development programs of the developing countries. This movement was generally intended as a shift from the conventional economic development approach which has been criticized for its failure to bring about beneficial change. The movement seeks to promote a global development strategy with the following specific objectives:

- a) to leave no sector of the population outside the scope of change and development;
- b) to effect structural change which favors national development and to enable all sectors of the population to participate in the development process;
- c) to aim at social equity, including the achievement of an equitable distribution of income and wealth in the nation; and
- d) to give high priority to the development of human potentials.

The general principles for the creation, management and implementation of the IAD project are the following (Cariño, et al, 1987):

Project Development

- a) IAD projects must be focused on areas with high incidence of poverty, but with good potential for growth.
- b) IAD projects should be formulated within the context of regional and local development plans and programs.
- c) IAD projects must evolve mainly from below, i.e. through the initiative of regional/local institutions.
- d) IAD projects must have the full commitment of all sectors concerned.
- e) IAD projects should, at the project design stage, include an environmental component, particularly with respect to establishing environmental parameters for development projects.
- f) Specific policy guidelines on the use of international loans to fund IAD projects must be adopted.

Management and Implementation

- g) The substantive focus of IAD projects should revolve around the problems and opportunities of physical accessibility, productivity and environmental sustainability.
- h) IAD projects must be conceived to serve as pump-priming mechanisms in the area of operation.
- i) The planning and management of IAD projects should include those sectors of government which address the problems and opportunities of the planning/development area concerned; a unified system of management particularly at the field level should be adopted.
- j) Coordinative mechanisms for IAD projects must satisfy the canon of cost-effectiveness.
- k) IAD projects must be planned and imple-

mented in a manner consistent with the adopted policy of decentralization.

- l) IAD projects must have strong components that provide for institutional development and technology transfer.
- m) IAD projects must include mechanisms for citizens participation.
- n) A system of periodic evaluation and review of IAD project activities must be institutionalized.

Continuance and Termination

- o) IAD projects should have a definite phase-out plan.

The Role of NACIAD in Rural Development

The primary goal of NACIAD is rapid development of the country's depressed rural areas to achieve a more balanced national development. Its specific objectives are as follows:

- 1) To institutionalize the implementing mechanisms for IAD through formal planning, monitoring, and budgetary controls.
- 2) To formulate an integrated framework plan to guide the development of the depressed areas.
- 3) To rationalize the participation of the rural people through their local governments in development planning and implementation.
- 4) To initiate small-scale, high-impact projects utilizing existing indigenous resources.
- 5) To mobilize efficiently multi-sectoral resources and properly channel these into IRD Projects.
- 6) To generate private sector participation in the IAD projects and establish the appropriate mechanisms for it.

As an example, a typical project plan under NACIAD's IAD could consist of:

- i) agricultural development package including extension, compact farms, irrigation;
- ii) infrastructure such as secondary roads and feeder roads, ports, flood control, and drainage;
- iii) land reform;
- iv) rural industries;
- v) social services like education, nutrition, health and family planning; and
- vi) cooperatives.

In non-IAD areas these are normally distinct programs administered by the different departments and agencies of central government. They are delivered through their respective regional and local offices. Provincial municipal and barangay or village governments serve as field arms of the national agencies in implementing development projects.

Organizational Arrangements

The NACIAD is mandated to coordinate and implement IAD programs and projects. It has a multi-level organization encompassing national as well as project level offices. It is composed of the Council, the Program Coordinating Committee, the Technical Secretariat and the Project Offices. The members of the Council are: the Secretaries of the Departments of Agrarian Reform, Agriculture and Food, Finance, Local Government, National Defense, Environment and Natural Resources, Public Works and Highways, Budget and Management, Trade and Industry, and the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and the Executive Director of NACIAD.

The IAD coordinative structures involving representatives from sectoral agencies, local governments and target beneficiaries have been

institutionalized at the national, regional and local levels. These coordinative structures and linkages provide for vertical and horizontal coordination. They also enable vertical integration from the national level to the lowest level of field operations.

To strengthen and formalize coordinative linkages at the national level, a Program Coordinating Committee was organized and is chaired by the NACIAD Executive Director. It is composed of the Assistant Secretaries and senior level representatives of the members of the Council, the Presidential Management Staff and the National Irrigation Administration. The Committee has the principal function of assisting the Council in promoting inter-agency commitments to IAD projects. Discussions on operational issues and implementation bottlenecks are made possible at this level without the necessity of convening a top-level Council meeting.

The Executive Director serves as the Council's Chief Operating Officer whose primary responsibility is implementing the policy decisions of the Council and ensuring the effective participation of the government agencies involved in IAD. The Executive Director, as Program Coordinating Chairman, also calls meetings regularly of a committee of project directors to get immediate feedback on the problems of the different project offices.

The Executive Director heads the Secretariat which provides technical support to the Council. The Secretariat is organized into three technical departments: the Program Planning and Development Department (PPDD), the Program Management Department (PMD) and the Policy Research and Development Department (PRDD). These departments are supported by Finance and Administrative Office (FAO), the Library and Data Center (LDC) and the Information Systems Development Unit (ISDU).

The PPDD undertakes the preparation of IAD programs and project plans for identified depressed areas with high growth potentials. The PMD monitors the financial status and

periodically evaluates the performance of the different IAD projects under the NACIAD umbrella. The PRDD on the other hand, reviews and analyzes key policy issues affecting IAD. It conducts policy research and formulates policy recommendations and guidelines to assist decision-making functions of the Council.

Project offices have been established in the specific IAD areas to decentralize the coordination and management of inter-agency planning and implementation of IAD project components. Decentralization of planning, coordination and management activities at the field level is being achieved through the project office and project support staff set-up. Project managers and directors of these project offices enjoy a great deal of political support at both national and local levels.

Components of sectoral projects are executed by concerned implementing agencies. The project office has a separate administrative set-up from the Council proper and is independent of any other department. It is linked to the Council through a designated Cabinet Coordinator who is responsible to the Council for the smooth operations of the project office. For project implementation in IAD project areas, horizontal and vertical linkages are established by the project offices through coordination with other related executing agencies.

The supervisory and coordinating authority of NACIAD extends to all levels of government through these linkage mechanisms. This system is necessary for the multi-level, multi-agency effort required for integrated area development — particularly in strengthening the coordination of inputs to project implementation.

The IAD Approach as Developed by NACIAD and as Distinguished From Other Rural Development Approaches

Before the adoption of the IAD strategy in the Philippines, a number of rural development programs and projects had been attempted, as

indicated earlier. The community development program which emphasized self-government and the organization of the villages, became popular during President Magsaysay's term. The program laid out the administrative infrastructure at the community and village levels. Other initiatives mentioned earlier failed to stress income-generating activities. Such activities were limited to self-help projects such as communal irrigation, public wells and feeder roads. They did not focus on the problem of poverty and did not achieve equitable distribution of income. These projects were treated in isolation and implemented independently and in a highly compartmentalized manner.

The IAD approach as developed by NACIAD has the following characteristics which distinguish it from the past rural development strategies and programs of the government (NACIAD, 1986):

a) Defined Geographic Unit

The IAD scheme is implemented within a sub-regional framework. Aside from using the political boundaries to delineate an IAD area, ecological units are also taken into consideration, such as river basins, to synchronize politico-economic administration with resource-based environmental system management.

b) Multi-sectoral in Operation

The projects of the different agencies are coordinated to produce complementary and reinforcing effects on the beneficiaries. The problem of rural poverty is complex and multi-dimensional in nature, therefore, to deal with the problem adequately, a total systems approach needs to be adopted within an area. Sectoral programs and projects are integrated and packaged for greater impact. This is done on the premise that the collective benefits from the overall program are greater than those from the individual projects.

c) Spatial Integration

The IAD boundaries are drawn to link rural production areas effectively with mar-

ket towns and urban centers. Spatial integration provides greater access to product and factor markets thereby inducing the farmers to produce beyond subsistence levels. Spatial integration supports the hypothesis that economic development occurs in a specific locational matrix, which is primarily rural-industrial in composition. The growth and efficiency of this matrix directly affect rural development. Boundaries of IAD projects were drawn to either encompass, or link, with the industrial-urban areas through a series of market relationships.

d) Grassroots Participation

An IAD program is designed to generate active and meaningful participation at the grassroots in both the planning/decision making process and in the implementation of projects. The participatory approach integrates people's needs and aspirations with the development activities of the government. Through this "bottom-up" approach, the responsibilities in development are shared by both the government and the local people.

e) Political Commitment

To ensure the effectiveness of IAD as an administrative framework encompassing existing local government structures and functions, a firm and explicit commitment at the highest political level is required.

f) Organizational Integration

The implementation of IAD projects requires an organization which has the coordinative authority and jurisdiction over the activities and resources of several departments. The IAD approach seeks to integrate programs and projects in specific area by considering functional linkages, resource utilization, access to basic services and local participation in the planning and implementation process in a manner consistent with national objectives.

The IAD approach is therefore a departure from unisectoral development schemes whereby various agencies working in an area

operated independently of each other without due regard for cooperation, coordination and integration of closely related activities.

The Implementation of NACIAD Projects

The present IAD projects have used a single province or multi-provincial and ecological boundaries, like a river basin or an island, as the basic planning and development unit. However, NACIAD has expressed preference for the selection of multi-provincial or river basin areas rather than a single province. The following processes in the identification and prioritization of potential areas for Integrated Area Development projects have been introduced by NACIAD:

- i) stratification of provinces based on resource potentials;
- ii) socio-economic scoring and ranking;
- iii) exclusion of programmed or pipeline areas; and
- iv) delineation of contiguous provinces for IAD priority listing.

Areas are stratified into five priority strata based on a matrix of resource potential indicators such as arable land area; fishpond areas and yield per hectare; population size and arable land density. Prioritization follows a descending order. The fifth stratum is given the highest priority while the first stratum, indicating the highly developed and relatively urbanized provinces, is given the lowest priority, if not excluded altogether.

Socio-economic indicators used to measure the level of development of the various provinces include income, employment, industrial activities, health, education, housing facilities, transport system and communication facilities.

In summary, the adoption of the IAD strategy in the Philippines is in deference to international pressures for an integrated approach to the planning and implementation of the

socio-economic development programs of the Third World countries. The creation of NACIAD has provided the institutional framework for carrying out such a strategy. The ultimate test of the effectiveness of the strategy and the administrative mechanism for its implementation is whether it has contributed to improving the welfare of the rural poor in the Philippines.

The final part of this paper will examine the effectiveness of NACIAD in relation to rural development planning and decision-making in the country.

IMPACTS OF NACIAD ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

How effective is NACIAD as a development agency charged with the responsibility to promote rural development? The impacts of NACIAD on rural development and administration, and its effectiveness in planning and implementation is to be assessed on the basis of the following factors: 1) coordination; 2) integration; and 3) participation.

Coordination

Follet (n.d.) states that there are certain principles of coordination in terms of organizational effectiveness:

Coordination should be made by [direct contact of] the responsible person or authority concerned; it should be at an early stage; coordination should be viewed as the reciprocal relations of all the factors in the situation; and lastly, it should be considered as a continuous process.

Follet further identifies compromise and integration as the two broad ways to achieve project coordination. She goes on to say that the problem of coordination in rural development activities can be properly met by creating vertical linkages between local governments and national bodies/agencies and by achieving horizontal integration among bodies comprising the institutional machinery for rural development at the field level.

In the Philippines, lack of coordination is identified as a chronic issue plaguing rural development planning. As a response to the slow, ineffective and often uncoordinated implementation of projects by the different sectoral agencies, NACIAD has been directed to coordinate and integrate all area development projects in the country. The IAD was adopted to provide an organizing concept for an effective and efficient coordination of project activities. The NACIAD has a multi-level organization encompassing national down to local project level offices. Its coordinative structures and linkages, involving representatives from sectoral agencies, local governments and the target beneficiaries, provide vertical and horizontal coordination and integration from top to bottom and vice-versa. In practice however, the intended coordinated program approach had not been fully achieved despite NACIAD's leadership and mandate. This is primarily because of the difficulties encountered in coordinating projects which had commenced prior to establishment of NACIAD in 1978. The old IAD projects have had their own management systems. New approaches introduced by the NACIAD could not be readily implemented.

Another problem is the lack of authority, for both NACIAD and the Project Offices, in coordinating the activities of implementing agencies. The authority of the Project Offices and NACIAD to influence the budget is nil. Budgets are prepared at the project level by the various departments and agencies, and an overall budget based on these, is prepared at the Project Office. Control is lost in many instances as the agency or department may change or alter these budgets at their regional or headquarters offices. They may be changed also by the Department of Budget and Management without consulting the NACIAD. In the present budgeting system:

Budgetary procedures appear inadequate in pursuing multi-sectoral and integrated/coordinated approaches to area development. As the budget preparation follows the traditional pattern of line agencies (i.e. mainly based on each participating agency's program

and project activities), there is always the problem that the needs and requirements of particular agencies may take precedence over those recommended in IAD programs or other development priorities. Under this condition, the officials of these line agencies tend to assume a marginal position in terms of divided allegiance between their ministries and IAD programs and projects. The resulting delays in project implementation or the deferment of critical project activities eventually lead to cost overruns (Jucaban et al, 1986).

Although the IAD project offices are mandated to oversee the efficient planning and implementation of the project, they are detached from the mainstream of the budgeting process and as such they are rendered ineffective in coordinating the activities of the respective line agencies.

Other problems attendant to coordinated implementation are as follows:

- a) available funds falling behind program schedules;
- b) inadequate budget appropriations and releases; and
- c) field offices having limited authority.

Iglesias (1980), for example, observed that rural development in the country never achieved organizational success. He argues that:

One of the major problems is the lack of coordination in efforts, resources and policies... that coordination problem happens to be "built-in" defect in rural development activities in the Philippines and that the experiences so far, are not of organizational or structural perfection but are of extraordinary "personality" and individual "role-orientation" variables.

Another study Brilliantes (1979) supports the conclusion that coordination is a major determinant of effectiveness. He reiterates that "confused authority, structure, poor leadership traits, obscure inter-agency relationships, diffused goals, lack of technical competence. . . have frustrated the essence of coordination in the Philippines' bureaucracy".

The lead agency concept (that is, the agency implementing the predominant component) has also confused the situation further. It shows that the very concept of lead agency creates geographical distance and generates a "long distance decision-making process" which affects rural development programs detrimentally. The project staff members are usually provided by the lead agency. For purposes of creating a multi-disciplinary orientation, detailed personnel from the cooperating agencies are requested. Problems identified from this arrangement have included conflicts resulting from divergent sectoral orientations of personnel. These create a feeling of individual perspectives, divided loyalties and personnel jealousies. This system exposes also the project to political interference.

Coordination is also particularly difficult for project components that are implemented through routine modes, where activities to support IAD are integrated into the sectoral agency's regular work program. Seconded personnel who are not fully released from their regular functions are withdrawn in the event of resource constraints or are replaced because they are reassigned to another function within their mother agency. Their replacement would have to go through the whole process of orientation and training again into the IAD systems and procedures before they could be integrated with the project.

It is expected that any agency would give higher priority to its own regular function in comparison to its commitment to an IAD project. Project offices have tended to solve this problem through hiring full-time staff who are fully paid from the project funds, to handle sectoral planning, monitoring and coordination. This practice consequently reduces the dependence on the staff of the existing line agencies, thereby limiting the opportunity for developing the planning capability of the existing line agencies and their personnel.

The mandate to coordinate also cannot prevail against the centralized executive authority of line agencies and that of the local govern-

ments and co-existing regional bodies. To ensure cooperation, formal and informal methods have been resorted to. They include the creation of adhoc bodies and committees, and the assignment of a cabinet coordinator at the highest policy and administrative level for the smooth interfacing of intersectoral inputs in project implementation.

Integration

Integration is necessary and desirable for comprehending and interrelating multiple needs, objectives and resources. Its chief potential virtue lies in pulling together complementary inputs, combining them into optimum packages and thus deriving the most benefit from them within a given period of time (Ocampo & Tancangco, n.d.). The concept of complementarity justifies the most common reason for integrated area development. It suggests varying degrees and combinations of organizational unification, inter-agency collaboration and coordination of resources, activities and results. The endeavors of the different government agencies and the private sector focusing on the different sectors of development such as health, education and agriculture, are coordinated to produce complementary and reinforcing benefits.

Integration or complementation has been attempted by the NACIAD and its IAD Project Offices, although NACIAD is observed to be lacking the sufficient power to perform its mandated tasks. Instead, it has sought to integrate and coordinate development projects through persuasion or through interpersonal relationships between the NACIAD/IAD Project Offices staff and those of the line operating agencies. It would have been more effective if NACIAD/IADPOs chief operating officers were able to command respect and secure the cooperation of their co-equals in the implementing agencies and at the field level as well.

A basically centralized and sectoralized national budgetary system wherein funds for the components of the project are separately

released to and controlled by the respective executing agencies has been a major problem in the IAD approval of the NACIAD. This approach needs a radical innovation toward integrated budgeting. A barrier to institutionalization has been the national resistance of central line agencies to relinquish control over funds allocated for sectoral components under their functional jurisdiction. Conflict may arise from differences in sectoral orientation and development views. Leadership and personality differences are other factors considered as problems.

There is also difficulty in synchronizing implementation in that each agency follows its own system of approaches and funds flow. Their unwillingness to divert and adjust to the systems and procedures required for the IADs achievement add to the existing problems. Studies related to rural development management reveal that the existing administrative procedures and structures have added to the difficulties in field implementation and integration: agencies have their own priorities, for instance, in allocation of resources and "pulling together complementary inputs" is easier said than done.

The highly centralized national agencies are often jealous of their primary expertise, budgets and authority to fully implement "coordinated" projects. They are often reluctant to delegate much of these to their own field units, let alone to other agencies.

Participation

Studies in public policy show the greater participation of the public in decision-making can result in improved outputs. Citizen participation in governmental affairs has been one of the cornerstones of democratic government (Huang and Naanep, 1982).

The participation of the grassroots and local officials in IAD planning and implementation is crucial to the successful development of a given area. Participation may be generated during the planning process for the determina-

tion of the goals and allocation of resources and during the course of the execution of the projects. This aspect of the IAD approach is deemed of vital importance by NACIAD. The grassroots must see the programs as reflective of their felt needs, as perceived and identified by them. A continuing dialogue with the local people is forever needed to determine their "wishes" and needs. The involvement of the citizens in the planning process in the past has been confined to their attendance at public hearings on the completed plans and programs. This type of participation resembles what the western planners have termed as "tokenism" or "placation" (MHS, 1985). The consultations which the local officials set up were actually meetings wherein the elders were taught the benefits of the barangay road and pressured to stop their protests and opposition (Sokoken, 1982).

The NACIAD is now seeking to institutionalize and encourage local level planning, whereby local leaders, together with government officials, are organized and trained to be more actively involved in the planning, implementation and evaluation of IAD programs and projects. Local officials, especially in the provincial governments, are consulted at the various states of project preparation and execution. The beneficiaries, on the other hand, are organized into cooperatives to ensure the proper maintenance of irrigation systems. The ultimate goal is to develop the capabilities of the provincial planners in local level planning. It will enable the local government to participate in the smooth transition of IAD projects from the project administrators to the local government after the program is completed. This is recognized in the recent seven-point strategy formulated by NACIAD which aims among others:

- i) to strengthen local resource mobilization and to actively involve local residents in sharing the benefits and costs of development; and
- ii) to promote the human resources development program to increase the technical and

managerial capability of rural development planners and implementors.

The strategy also recognizes the existing and potential roles of the private sector in the implementation of the IAD programs. Private sector mobilization has been tapped in the IAD projects at field levels through the creation of area advisory councils or development teams. Every IAD on-going project is tasked with encouraging participation of the private sector, especially small and medium scale business enterprises in the planning and implementation of projects. However, much still is needed to be achieved. The apparent reluctance of private investors to invest in the region can be attributed to the fact that under the present conditions in the country, there is very low motivation for existing firms to branch out into, or for new firms to locate in the regions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has utilized the interrelated criteria on coordination, integration and participation in assessing the effectiveness of such multi-disciplinary bodies as NACIAD. In fact, one aspect cannot be modified without causing rippling or modifying effects on the other elements.

Major problems encountered by the NACIAD in operationalizing its IAD strategy in the Philippines are:

- 1) Difficulty in adopting the comprehensive approach due to heavy sectoral orientation of the implementing agencies;
- 2) Difficulty of vertical and horizontal integration due to the diverse planning approaches and sectoral orientation of programs and projects pursued by the executing agencies;
- 3) Minimal, or lack of, grassroots participation in the areas of policy formulation, planning, implementation and evaluation of rural development programs.

On the basis of these observations, one could conclude that the NACIAD has only marginally improved rural development administration in the country. While its experience has served to highlight and focus political attention on the key issues in rural development, some form of political guidance is needed now to respond to these issues.

This study therefore recommends a total re-examination by the government of the role of NACIAD. A complementary consideration of the IAD strategy and its usefulness to the Philippines setting is necessary as well.

The following are the recommended actions to improve the effectiveness of the agency under study:

Coordination and Integration

On coordination and integration, there is a need to strengthen the coordination scheme for integrating the programs and projects of the different national line agencies at the project level. NACIAD should be given specific powers and authority which in effect would serve as a control mechanism. There should be authority and resources to sanction any group or individuals who do not follow its directives for implementation and operation. Specifically, the following should be given due consideration:

- a) Strengthen NACIAD's power to bring the old IAD projects established prior to NACIAD under its full control. Provide the leverage for NACIAD to effectively coordinate and integrate the various departments and agencies involved in IAD projects;
- b) Common source of funds should be established. This would help integrate the planning and implementation of line agencies instead of implementing projects through their respective sources of funds.
- c) There should be a means to make development programs responsive to the needs and conditions of the rural people. There should be assistance to people to identify and arti-

culate their problems and needs, to translate these into goals and objectives and into concrete programs and projects.

- d) Eradicate the "kanya-kanya" (individual perspectives) mentality.

Participation

Beneficiary involvement should be re-examined in the light of more active participation in project planning, implementation and evaluation of rural development programs and projects.

Strengthening the mechanism for active involvement could be done by:

- a) preparing of barangays for bottom-up planning through transmission of planning technology to the villages;
- b) developing community organization within the villages;
- c) developing the leadership capability at the village level; and
- d) re-orienting government agencies implementing the IAD programs and projects and the local people to the philosophy of IAD and its requirement on grassroots participation.

The prospects of making further progress and improvement in rural development and administration in general, and of the NACIAD in particular depend not only on the above recommendations but also on domestic political stability and performance of the world economy as well.

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POVERTY ALLEVIATION THROUGH INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT (IRD)*

Daisy Elena F. Ano

INTRODUCTION

The industry-led growth which dominated development policy in the last two decades has resulted in a paradox manifested by an increased rate of average per capita Gross National Product (GNP) but with the aggregate welfare failing to "trickle down" beyond the modern industrial sector, and having little or no benefit to the majority of the population especially in the Third World. This polarization of development, in turn, has given rise to questions regarding the expected benefits from the adopted policy. As a result, this dissatisfaction with the outcome of the urban-based industrialization strategy has, in recent years, generated new approaches and alternatives in development planning.

The shift from "growth-first-distribute-later" into "growth-with-equity" goals characterize the trends in national and regional development today. The meaning of development has been redefined to accommodate the majority of the people in the development process and to ensure that the fruits of development will redound to the benefit of the poorer segments of society.

The growing realization that the expansion of economic participation is essential to sustained development brought about a change in development policy since the late 1960s. Governments that once sought rapid growth

in GNP through large-scale, capital-intensive and urban-based industrialization, now seek a more balanced and widely-based economy.

The new directions in development policy were shaped more strongly by the realization that gaps in income and wealth among nations and within them are growing rather than diminishing. Even those countries with high levels of growth have large concentrations of poor that remain relatively excluded from the benefits of development.

The patterns of inequality reveal themselves in various spatial and social dimensions among rich and poor nations, between regions in a country, and between the city and its environs. However, the incidence of poverty resulting from these inequalities appear to be concentrated most in the rural areas. Rural areas were left without the resources needed to benefit from potential linkages of urban industrialization.

The poverty syndrome in the rural areas of developing countries consists of the following features, among others:

- 1) low level of relative productivity, whether of agriculture or rural industry;
- 2) high rate of unemployment;
- 3) underutilization of human and other natural resources;
- 4) poor quality of educational facilities;
- 5) high population growth;

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- 6) inadequate health care;
- 7) dearth of investment in physical infrastructure necessary for development;
- 8) insufficient access to public services;
- 9) low income levels;
- 10) low level of social status and influence;
- 11) limited view of the future leading to acceptance of current conditions and reluctance to take risks in changing such conditions; and
- 12) low level of citizen participation in community affairs.

These features are commonly interrelated and account for the circular character of rural poverty Conde, et al. 1980).

THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT

The need to promote economic and social development by integrating all or some of the necessary elements is a fairly recent idea which grew out of the disappointments caused by the incoherent action programs proposed for developing countries. The integration concept, however, has been used loosely and sometimes incongruously to label all kinds of activities.

The basic idea underlying an integrated approach to development is that all the sectors involved can and must contribute effectively to the objectives set in the development process.

Integrated development addresses itself to the spatial dimensions of increasing disparities, particularly in terms of access to productive resources, social services, and physical facilities.

In most developing countries, there is a rising concern for bridging the gap caused by a highly urbanized primate city with little or no

productive relationship with the rural villages in the countryside. The experience with concentrating investments in large cities, as argued from the viewpoint of economies of scale and national profitability as a whole, is that it has complicated the problem of over-urbanization and rural poverty. On the other hand, a purely rural area-focused strategy has resulted in a highly dispersed investment with minimum impact. Considering the meager resources available in developing countries, such a strategy would be considered inefficient.

The concept of integrated development stems from the acceptance that large cities and rural communities within a region both play crucial roles in the development process. It provides a balanced spatial framework at which the whole gamut of human settlements — villages, market towns, intermediate cities, and metropolitan areas — must be strengthened and integrated into a mutually sustaining network of national production, distribution, and exchange centers (Rondinelli, 1978).

Doubts have been expressed about the ability of the integrated approach to meet the requirements of real multisectoral development. It is nevertheless claimed that no other approach is deemed possible apart from that of integration to reduce or eliminate regional and/or sectoral imbalance, and ultimately bring about conditions favorable to self-sufficient development and the full use of local human and natural resources.

THE CONCERN FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

In practice, there are several rural development concepts. For regions which are essentially rural in character, this means that poverty is no longer a concept needing solely a technical solution. Poverty has reached a level wherein all the rural sectors and sub-systems become highly complementary and interdependent in the struggle for a better way of life.

Friedmann (1980) listed the reasons for the recent, growing interest in rural development:

- 1) The modern industrial sector is providing insufficient employment to absorb the growing number of non-productive rural workers;
- 2) There continues to be a positive rate of increase in rural population and labor force;
- 3) The physical living conditions possibly of a majority of rural people are deteriorating to subsistence levels or even below;
- 4) The application of technical solutions to the problems of food production is limited only to certain favored regions;
- 5) The increase in agricultural production occur overwhelmingly on larger farm-holdings to the disadvantage of the majority of small farmers;
- 6) In many Asian countries, rural people with either no land or rather small land-holdings are forced to work for wages in rural areas;
- 7) The persisting decline in the ratio of population to land necessitates increasing land productivity; and
- 8) The index of inequality in landholdings tends to be rising as a result of advantages of large farmers to adopt new technology enabling them to acquire more land from small farmers and the continued parcelization of small holdings due to increasing population.

The above list supports the view that land concentration and other institutional arrangements surrounding access to production in rural areas have abetted trends towards increasing rural inequalities and worsened the position of the lowest income groups.

ELEMENTS ON AN INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

Lessons from experience with rural develop-

ment programs have triggered the quest for a more satisfactory approach to rural development, culminating in integrated rural development programs. The concept of integrated rural development, and thus the resulting program configuration, is likely to be defined differently in different settings and in accordance with the definers' frames of reference.

In Asia, the term "integrated rural development" is more widely used to designate corresponding national programs, and there appears to be a more universally shared understanding of the term.

Newer definitions of integrated rural development do not deviate much from the old, with reference to the interface and mutual reinforcement between social and economic development at both national and subnational levels and to the consequent need for comprehensive approaches to rural development. However, current definitions more explicitly identify the poor in the rural areas as the principal client, and more directly aim programs at such specific goals as employment, increased agricultural productivity, greater access by the rural poor to public services, etc. as a refinement to the earlier rural development program approaches.

Integrated rural development is a planning concept referring to an approach which stresses the coordination, within given regions, of programs that are intended to benefit the majority of the population. These programs generally include, but are not limited to agriculture. The Rehovot approach in Israel, however, considers agriculture as the prerequisite to rural development.

By the late 1960s, it became apparent that the only hope for accelerating rural economic development with greater social equity would be to increase agricultural productivity and diversify rural economies through integrated rural development programs.

There are identified general preconditions to integrated rural development common to most rural development approaches in different

countries. These preconditions are supposed to be related and mutually reinforcing for building the productive capacity of the rural areas. They deal mostly with the important organizational and policy requirements regardless of ideological differences and types of economies.

Policy and Administrative Support

Political commitment and administrative support for rural development policies are the most important requirements to ensure the success of a rural development program. The problems of rural poverty persist in most developing countries precisely because the weakness of political commitment to change and because administrative structures and coordinative capacities are inadequate for expanding participation in economic activity. Political support requires an articulation of a rural development policy in the development plans and legislations. Further, political support is expressed in terms of resources allocation decisions in favor of rural development programs.

Administrative support means a more decentralized administrative structure and coordinative capacity. Decentralization should be a balance between national and local administration and implemented in terms of the identified functional competence at certain levels. The regional administrative units are also seen to be suitable for coordinating rural development plans and programs.

The most effective implementing structure may vary from one country to another. In most countries, rural development is handled by regional development authorities mandated to oversee the integrated aspects of the rural development program implementation and with substantial powers and authority over resources and implementors. This approach, which basically espouses territorial integration, covers both horizontal and vertical linkages. As Friedmann (1980) pointed out, rural development must be centrally guided but locally based. He outlined this in two steps: the first and necessary step is to devolve substantial and effective

power to a democratically constituted level of local governance that is concerned with the determination and implementation of rural development programs; and the second involves the delimitation of a territory over which the newly constituted political authority will extend its rule.

The consensus, however, is on the elements required for an effective planning and implementation of rural development programs. A World Bank sector policy paper (1975) enumerates these elements to cover the following:

- 1) The need for a national plan or program of action for rural development, together with supporting national and regional policies and adequate financial arrangements;
- 2) A strong organization at the national level to coordinate vertically-organized central government sectoral departments;
- 3) Greater decentralization with effective machinery on the regional and local levels to coordinate the sectoral activities of national departments operating in the region, and regional and local departments; and
- 4) Participation by the rural poor in the planning and implementation process through the local government, project advisory committee, cooperatives and other forms of group organization.

Local Organization and Community Participation

Rural development projects succeed or fail on the strength and competence of implementing organizations. The more successful experiments in rural development have involved local leaders and rural communities directly in major activities.

Sustaining social and economic transformation in rural areas requires the strengthening of the local government's capacity to plan and

manage public facilities and to deliver basic social services.

Most countries implementing rural development programs rely heavily on expatriate managers and technicians as staff. This is due to the shortage of skilled manpower to plan, manage, and operate projects at the local level.

Utilizing existing local institutions and organizations would mean training project managers indigenous to the area to ensure project continuity. The focus of local capability building should also include local resource management in terms of increasing local revenue generation and giving more autonomy to local governments in operating and making decisions regarding expenditure.

Participation is also central to the search for ways to attack the problems of poverty and inequitable distribution of resources and services. White (1981) cites three dimensions of participation, namely:

- 1) Involvement of all those affected in decision-making about what should be done and how;
- 2) Mass contribution to the development effort, i.e., to the implementation of the decisions; and
- 3) Sharing in the benefits of the program.

Community participation denotes the participation of an organized social entity, however loose and informal, as distinguished from just the individual inhabitants of a locality. Proponents of popular participation argue from the point of view of the key limitations of centralized service delivery approaches to benefiting rural and urban poor such as: government agencies' limited reach; inability to sustain necessary local level action; limited adaptability to local circumstances; and avoiding the creation of dependency by increasing people's capacity for self-help.

In addition, participation leads to a sense of responsibility for the project and thus commits

the participants to the maintenance of the project.

Implementation Strategy

Aside from the elements discussed in the preceding paragraphs there are other inputs in the application of an integrated rural development approach that may not be true in all the countries adopting this strategy.

As the experience in China showed, altering production relations is a key element but must be reinforced by policies which ensure that effective control over the use and distribution of rural surplus and resources remains with those who produce them (Chong-Tong Wu, 1980).

The notion of rural underdevelopment as a consequence of the extraction of rural surplus rather than the lack of ability of the rural population to produce it coincides with the new concepts of "agropolitan development" and "selective regional closure".

Mabogunje (1981) cited similarly in his article, "The Dilemma of Rural Development in Africa", that the design of an effective programs for rural development involves a strategy for unblocking the barriers to a new system of social relations for production in a country. He further stated that this aspect is usually overlooked due to some apprehensions of the governments of its ideological implications. He then outlined six sets of activities important in rural development:

- 1) Land reform;
- 2) Agrarian reform;
- 3) Infrastructural development;
- 4) Provision of social amenities;
- 5) Institutional development; and
- 6) Political participation.

Likewise, Griffin (1981) supports the contention that the most direct way of reducing

rural poverty is by redistributing productive assets. In Asia, he cited the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, in addition to China. Also, decades of experience in the welfare states of Europe have underlined the difficulty of raising the share of the poor in the national income without undertaking major structural reforms.

There is an implementation dilemma when most governments find it more convenient to adopt a purely investment-based approach to rural development as against the full mobilization of the rural population to provide their labor and sometimes their own capital.

Usually, integrated rural development projects have limited coverage, sometimes focusing only on selected poverty groups. In most countries, where 80 to 90 percent of the population are poor, the undertaking will have to be on a national scale.

One major cause for piecemeal implementation is the country's scarce resources to finance a comprehensive integrated rural development approach. This constraint is compounded by the effect of dependence on international assistance to finance such programs or projects. Most of the time, the emphasis is only on infrastructure development.

Rural employment schemes as part of the rural development program are identified as important in directing new income flows predominantly to the poor, and at the same time, generating new increases in output. However, the preconditions set for a successful rural employment program would mean capital formation through the construction of durable assets in rural areas by the poor themselves; and making these assets the property of those who constructed them (e.g. cooperative where the laborers are affiliated).

Most programs applied in the developing countries do not tackle the development of the rural system directly. This distinguishes agricultural development and rural development needs. Agricultural development programs aim only at augmenting the economic

gains of the agricultural population by improving the technical conditions governing productivity. Rural development is concerned with employment problems as well, and with progress in social services, with the rural way of life and the creation of infrastructures.

An anti-poverty focused rural development is also seen to require small, labor-intensive investment projects dispersed throughout the countryside, which are identified locally. The desirability and feasibility of these projects also determined locally. The dispersal of industries to rural areas would not mean imposing the kind of industries the rural areas will need. Instead, the plans for rural development will have to be made locally by those who will implement them, benefit from them, and even bear the major cost.

Some countries initiated integrated rural development programs as community development programs (e.g. India in the 50s). It was a comprehensive self-help movement covering education, health, drinking water, agricultural production, and cottage industries.

In its latter applications, the IRD approach, as in the case of the Philippines, was redefined to cover integrated area development. However, it is argued that such redefinition focuses only on the importance of multisectoral project integration and bureaucratic coordination within definable area units.

CONCLUSION

There can be no fast and rigid rules to integrated rural development implementation. The success or failure of integrated rural development programs have to stand the test of time. There may be similar conditions existing in successful integrated rural development programs but they may be due to close adherence to the identified critical elements of integrated rural development implementation or perhaps, coincidental in nature.

Only through a close scrutiny of both successful and not so successful programs can

one learn and adjust implementation procedures. Such scrutiny, however, should be made with due consideration to the environment in which such programs are implemented. Some even claim that political leaders in countries with successful rural development programs played the most important role.

In the light of all these considerations, the fundamental concerns are in the acceptance that the true meaning of development goes beyond the quantitative measure of national output and that any program that conveys no goals for reducing poverty, unemployment, and inequality can hardly be considered a development program.

Seers (1971) expressed this parting statement most appropriate to this subject as: "A country that leaves its social problems unsolved is unlikely to be strong enough to achieve or maintain genuine independence — it may not even survive as a political unit."

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URBAN PLANNING AND STATE CORPORATISM: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE UNDER MARTIAL LAW

Ernesto M. Serote

Introduction

This paper attempts to recapture an episode in Philippine history in which the country was placed under martial law by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for a decade or so. To the growing body of works assessing the impact of martial law on various aspects of Philippine society, this paper adds its own contribution by inquiring into how martial law has affected the philosophy and practice of urban planning.

Interest in this particular period derives from the fact that it represents a different kind of experience in the political life of the Philippines. More of interest to this paper is the fact that it was under martial law that urban planning seems to have been given unparalleled attention and support by the government.

The specific aims of this paper are:

- 1) To show that the political system that Marcos instituted which he euphemistically called "constitutional authoritarianism" is in reality a form of state corporatism. This has provided a favorable climate for the rise to prominence of a technocratic sector that was largely responsible for popularizing the practice and jargon of planning.
- 2) To argue that "cronyism" into which state corporatism later degenerated has negated whatever gains Philippine urban planning may have attained. In short, it will be shown that urban planning is both a beneficiary and a victim of martial law.
- 3) To speculate on the likely future of urban planning in the light of past ex-

perience and of available indications from the current government of Mrs. Aquino.

This paper confirms Cawson's thesis that planning cannot be politically neutral and that planners are in a "key position to be able to encourage the development of public attitudes which politicians might articulate as the basis of the political will to transform society" (Cawson 1977, 23). The obverse of Cawson's thesis is also true, namely, that planners can be utilized by politicians to "deodorize" their patently unpopular decisions or even to design schemes that may not be in the public interest but are beneficial to politicians. This paper makes the latter observation abundantly clear.

Why martial law?

What made Marcos put the country under one-man rule only he can tell. And what he has told so far is that he wanted to save the Republic from an impending revolution and to reform Philippine society. This is the official version (Marcos 1974; Marcos 1981). His detractors however claim that there was no justification for him to do so except his consuming desire to hold on to the presidency beyond his two elective terms but that the Constitution forbade him to (Manglapus 1976). Detractors further claim that even if it is true that Philippine society needed reforming, the people had already opted to take the path of democratic reform. The Constitutional Convention that was in progress at the time he declared martial law was a sign that the people wanted to give democracy a chance rather than take the undemocratic path to social reform. Just what was

the state of the Philippine society before and at the time Marcos declared martial law?

Philippine society in 1971 was described by Arce and Abad (in Bresnan, ed. 1986) as comprising two sectors: the advantaged and the disadvantaged. The advantaged sector was a relatively small but a significant and powerful one because it controlled much of the nation's resources and headed the country's public and private bureaucracies. Members of this sector were the government officials and business leaders who were also the big landowners whose tenure dates back to colonial times. Their families lived in affluence both in the cities and in the provinces where their lands and businesses were located. They flaunted lifestyles that were modeled after those of Western nations. In their surplus accumulation they were assisted by a host of white collar workers in various public and private institutions as well as by the labor of tenants and lowly paid manual workers.

The disadvantaged sector, on the other hand, was composed mostly of rural dwellers who eked out a precarious existence as upland farmers, lowland tenants or agricultural workers, loggers, fisherman, and similar occupations demanding physical toil. In the urban areas, they were the squatters and slum dwellers, hawkers and street peddlers, scavengers, and others engaged in activities that yielded marginal returns. Also included in this sector were the domestics and lowly paid public employees like teachers, policemen, utility workers, and factory workers.

In graphical terms, Arce and Abad, citing government figures, drew a contrast between the advantaged and the disadvantaged sectors: The richest 10 percent of households received 37 percent of total income whereas the poorest 60 percent received a mere 25 percent (1986, 58). This is indicative of the excessive concentration of wealth and productive resources in the hands of a relatively small number of families. Attempts to break this iniquitous situation through peasant movements had been crushed by the government with American aid. Social reform through legislation like land reform could not prosper because the landed elite either sat in Congress or were members of the Cabinet (Steinberg, in Bresnan, ed. 1986, 52).

The situation was indeed potentially explosive. Observers, including President Marcos himself, often described the country as sitting on

top of a social volcano, ready to erupt at any time. But there was one more peaceful alternative remaining and the people obviously opted for it. They got the Congress to call, albeit grudgingly, a Constitutional Convention that they hoped would write into a new fundamental law their hopes and ideals for a just society. The Convention started work in June, 1971, and was winding up its business when martial law struck. Perhaps the true reason why Marcos declared martial law can be found, on one hand, in the objective conditions obtaining in Philippine society at the time, and, on the other hand, in the subjective conditions occurring in Marcos' own personality and that of his wife Imelda. Roth (1973, 816-817) observed:

"Marcos is a strong personality, reinforced by an equally strong wife. He had nourished the desire to make an imprint on history but he always found himself frustrated by a power structure characterized by the existence of an all-pervasive, though incoherent and even anarchistic oligarchic traditional elite. Marcos is a man of action but for the elite politics is but a game. True to the stereotypes of his own native Ilocos region he has always lived a frugal conservative existence. His own personal tastes are simple. He aspires more to power, success and fame than to abundance. Yet seemingly unexplained is the massive wealth accumulated during his years in office. An insight into the apparent irony is gained from the background of his wife. Born a poor cousin of the wealthy aristocratic Romualdez family, she is apparently driven to prove herself as first lady and [as a member] in her own right amidst the wealthiest of the wealthy".

Given his overriding concern to make his mark in history, to be a success in everything he chooses, and given the shackles of a reactionary Congress and an anarchic national political structure, he took the one decisive step to liberalize himself through the achievement of total power. On September 23, 1972, he staged a coup on his own government and put the entire country under martial law.

Indeed, the events that preceded martial law were creating an unfavorable climate for business, foreign or local. In the Muslim south a rebellion was being waged by the Mindanao Independence Movement. Elsewhere the Com-

munist Party and its military arm, the New People's Army, were allegedly planning a series of assassinations of top-ranking government officials. In Manila, street demonstrations were being violently dispersed by the military. Bombings were growing more and more frequent although the targets were so ridiculously ill-chosen as to have any propaganda value, like the toilet of the Constitutional Convention hall (Manglapus 1976). But whether these bombings were staged or not, they were creating a crisis situation and an atmosphere of anarchy. The ordinary citizen was hoping someone would just put things in order so that he could live in peace. When Marcos presented himself as *that* someone who promised not only to keep the peace but also to establish a new social order, not a few expressed reservations but they were willing nonetheless to give him the benefit of the doubt. The dual task that he set for himself then was to restore social order and establish what he called "new society".

The first task, to control anarchy and maintain peace and order, was to be assigned to the military. Within a few weeks, thousands were arrested: members of the oligarchy accused of conspiracy against the President, politicians with their own private armies or who were his outspoken critics, journalists, labor, student and peasant organizations, and petty criminals. More than half a million guns of various makes were collected from political warlords. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed. Above all, Congress was suspended.

The second task, restructuring Philippine society was to be the joint effort of the technocrats, the bureaucracy, the military, selected representatives of the business community, certain foreigners, the Marcos family and their friends, and the "common man". The common man entered into the picture to give a semblance of popular participation, although his role was merely to ratify, elaborate and implement plans and programs. Planning and decision making were to be highly centralized in a number of executive agencies whose recommendations were issued by Marcos as decrees, proclamations, general orders, or letters of instruction. The military was to maintain a visible presence even in civilian life. In fact, many retired generals were co-opted to sit in the boards of government-owned or controlled corporations.

Constitutional authoritarianism

Along with "new society" Marcos used another euphemism for his dictatorship: constitutional authoritarianism. Stripped of its window dressing, however, the political system that emerged exhibited the characteristics of state corporatism: state control of the economy through regulatory policies, sectoral planning and public enterprise; emergence of a more professionalized and achievement-oriented civil servants; and forced corporatization of interest representation from above.

The above-cited characteristics, formulated by Manoilescu, distinguish state or authoritarian, corporatism from societal or consensual corporatism. The former occurs mainly in societies where capitalist penetration is delayed and incomplete, such as in most of the Third World; the latter is typical of mature capitalist states like Britain. Consensual corporatism is a product of mature capitalism in which economic interest groups had developed centers of power along with the extension of state interventionism, but neither creatures of, nor autonomous from it. Neither corporate groups nor state agencies could achieve their ends without the active cooperation, or at least a grudging acceptance of the other (Cawson 1986, 68-89). Under state corporatism, in contrast, the state takes the lead in running a highly nationalized political economy, ostensibly to enhance the ability of the nation to control its own decisions, free it to a degree from outside domination, and break the pattern of dependency. As Manoilescu puts it, the resort to corporatism "arises from an awareness of relative underdevelopment, resentment against inferior international status, (and) desire for enhanced national economic and political autarky" (Stauffer 1977, 394).

Reviewing the situation in the Philippines in 1977, Stauffer found that the emerging political system was decidedly corporatist, citing the following evidences:

- 1) Competing groups were forced to merge under state sponsorship.
- 2) Laborers were coerced into "cooperating" with management and the government in building the economy.
- 3) Private associations were integrated under a formula of a single peak body for each profession, economic function, or social activity.

- 4) Government-sponsored and controlled "representative" bodies were created.
- 5) Disciplined "harmony" was decreed as the basis for building the new society along with "developmentalism".
- 6) The military was accorded new honor, respect and power.
- 7) Massive public information programs were directed towards socializing the population into the values of the new order (Stauffer 1977, 393-407).

The role of technocrats

The new social and political order has enhanced the role and status of technocrats. As Manglapus observed, the technocrat is the "closest ally of the modernizing despot" (1976, 45). The latter uses the former to rationalize his decisions; the former uses the latter to transform into policy whatever class or sectoral goals and interests he represents.

Urban planners are one such type of technocrats. In decades past, urban planning suffered from constitutional and statutory provisions that were over protective of private property rights, as well as the control by the landed elite of national and local legislative bodies. It may be noted that the early generation of urban planners had their formal planning education abroad or had been under teachers who were trained abroad, mainly in Australia, Canada, and Britain. Having imbibed the egalitarian and welfare ideals of post-war town and country planning, they were feeling increasingly frustrated about the existing social inequalities associated with property ownership. They felt strongly that something must be done and that planning had something to contribute to social reforms. Under martial Law they found the use of state compulsion a great help in achieving their goals. The chance to actually write policies themselves and see them directly transformed into law must have given them a sense of power which they exercised with great zeal and in some instances, with a vengeance.

One other factor that had encouraged them to prepare radical policies particularly with regard to the use of urban lands was the reformist intent and content of the new (1973) Constitution. In contrast to the old (1935) Constitution which was over protective of private property ownership and which had

reinforced the absolute individualistic attitude of landowners, the new Constitution has introduced the concept of stewardship or social responsibility attached to private property ownership (Espiritu 1979, 96). Article II, Section 6 reads: "The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare and security of all people. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Such a radical provision could not have easily compelled the elite-dominated Congress to enact the necessary legislation that would have radical effects. But with Congress suspended, the technocrats found themselves literally legislating without the benefit of public debate. One clear example of such legislation is the urban land reform law (PD 1517) enacted in 1978. It is one piece of legislation that would never have merited deliberation by the old Congress. Its ideas and concepts are novel and untried. In terms of style and content the decree is shot through with technocratise.

During the early years of martial law the urban planners did not have a direct link to the President. They were inconspicuously working in planning staffs of national agencies dealing with housing, infrastructures and natural resources. A minority of them chose to work with local governments; the majority did not like to go to the local governments where their expertise was most relevant in the first place due to the unattractive remuneration that financially strapped local authorities could afford to offer. In contrast, the economic planners have always had a direct role in policy making through the National Economic Council (later renamed National Economic and Development Authority), the central planning agency of the national government, headed by the Minister of Planning.

The much-needed connection came with the appointment of Mrs. Marcos, first as Governor of Metro Manila in 1975 and later as Minister of Human Settlements, in 1978. Given the position and prestige of its new-found advocate, urban planning was no longer difficult to promote as a government concern deserving no less than a cabinet portfolio. The weight of the first lady's influence also made the local authorities want to embrace planning even just for its demonstration effect alone.

State corporatism and cronyism

Cronyism is the excessive concentration of economic power in the hands of a few palace favorites, friends and relatives of the President called cronies. Although the practice is not unique to the Philippines, cronyism was nonetheless pursued to its ultimate if obscene perfection by Marcos. Using his decree-making powers, he created monopolies and oligopolies in practically all sectors of the economy. By the simple expedient of issuing a decree a corporation was created or existing ones expanded or merged or else reorganized. Invariably, he assigned his cronies to the governing boards of such corporations. And since there were not enough cronies to go around a system of interlocking directorates was practised wherein one crony sat in the board of as many as fifty companies including their own private businesses. Their extensive privileges included that of using government financial institutions as their "in house" banks (Villegas in Bresnan, ed., 1986, 163). They also had a free rein on foreign borrowing with almost unlimited government guarantee. The main rationale for cronyism derives from the basic motivation for state corporatism: economic nationalism. In the Philippines under Marcos, economic nationalism ostensibly meant wresting the economy from Chinese stranglehold and welding together government and private sectors in a common pursuit to build the nation in the same manner as the Japanese, South Koreans and Taiwanese did to their countries. The cronies were to be the equivalent of the Japanese *zaibatsus* or nationalistic economic managers. But Marcos' version of economic nationalism was faulted in that not all the cronies were non-Chinese. Also, the abilities of these cronies as economic managers were suspected. One respected Filipino economist writes: "There is no guarantee that one's cronies are competent, hardworking, or enlightened entrepreneurs. But even if, by sheer luck, the majority of the cronies turned out to be truly entrepreneurial, there was still the question of whether or not they would. . . put the good of the nation above their private interests. . . . With a few notable exceptions, the cronies cared very little about what they were doing to the national economy. It is very likely that they were more interested in enriching themselves in the short run than in building industrial empires" (Villegas, in Bresnan, ed. 1986, 164).

Stauffer further noted that, although the system-type that he found emerging was unmistakably corporatist by the kind of new institutions established, the uses to which such institutions have been put, however, seemed to negate the very rationale for state corporatism. More than ever, he concluded, the "new society" has provided the "framework for a closer integration of the Philippines into the world market economy under conditions that insure its dependence on outside inputs and corresponding controls" (Stauffer 1977, 407). This is obviously the handiwork of cronies.

Thus, the cronies constituted the new oligarchy. Marcos himself admitted having established a new oligarchy in a speech in 1975 celebrating the third anniversary of martial law. He noted that martial law may have "liquidated an oligarchy only to set up a new oligarchy. . . , (establishing) massive opportunities for graft, corruption, and misuse of influence — opportunities which are now being exploited within the government service." (Quoted by Steinberg in Bresnan, ed. 1986, 53).

One typical but in many ways atypical agency in the government service was the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS). On June 2, 1978 the MHS was created under PD 1396 with no less than Mrs. Marcos as the minister. This is an indication of the seemingly all-out political support to urban planning.

The MHS was in every sense a super agency. Functionally, it saw itself as the provider of the eleven basic needs of human settlements which MHS technocrats identified as water, power, food, clothing, shelter, medical services, education, sports and recreation, economic base (livelihood), mobility, and ecological balance (PD. 1396, Preamble). These basic needs encompass practically the entire gamut of concerns of government which existing ministries were already dealing with. Operationally, the MHS was organized like a business corporation, authorized to go into business and earn profits. It was the mandate, the underlying philosophy and the organizational network of the MHS that the cronies utilized in the systematic plunder of the nation's economy.

Cronyism and urban planning

Despite the big push that the Marcos government seems to have given to urban planning in

the earlier stages of martial law, the events of later years may have nullified earlier gains when cronyism became rampant. The vast network of the MHS became the avenue by which the cronies carried out their scheme of unfettered accumulation. They justified their policies and actions through the gratuitous interpretation of urban planning concepts like 'human settlements' and 'basic needs' and by centralizing the delivery of these basic needs for easier control.

Eleven basic needs. The concept of basic needs is so open-ended it can be interpreted in infinite ways (ILO 1976; Ghai, et. al. 1977). Usually the concept of hierarchy of needs is also added to indicate the relativeness of needs depending on the target group. But as a development strategy it is understood to be a poverty-ameliorating approach that concentrates on the "poorest of the poor" to enable them to meet certain minimum requirements so that they can, eventually participate in the social and economic and finally political life of the community. Initially therefore, the package of basic needs cannot contain all that many items. Other needs are added incrementally while other needs eventually lose their importance as the target groups attain greater resources and improvement. Consequently, they increase the level of their relative participation in providing their needs, and correspondingly, they lower the component of external assistance. This in theory is how the basic needs approach works. Its essential concomitant is self-reliance, i.e. giving assistance to eliminate the need for further assistance.

Human settlements planners in the MHS did not seem to have a clear conception of what the basic needs approach entailed when Mrs. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements, adopted it as the underlying philosophy of her programs. Arbitrariness and superstition reportedly prevailed when the MHS planners decided on the number of items to be included in the basic needs package, the number "eleven" being a lucky number of the Marcoses.

Thus the officially identified basic needs came to eleven in number, presumably of equal importance since no attempt was made to classify and prioritize them like any planner should. Another explanation is that 'human settlements' was apparently taken to mean 'all settlements' without reference to any type or class of settlements. Indeed, the concept of human settlements itself is so all-embracing that

practically nothing exists that is not encompassed by it. The very comprehensiveness of the concept was used to justify meddling by MHS with the traditional functions of other existing agencies, to the consternation of the latter.

The eleven basic needs became the organizing concept of all town plans. Every town plan was expected to contain a list of projects under each of the eleven basic needs. It is not uncommon therefore, to find the most ludicrous projects that do not at all reflect the local conditions. But more ridiculous is the fact that, although every town plan had paper projects to provide for each of the basic needs, none of these concerns was within the power of the local governments to provide! These goods or services were provided either by the market or by national government agencies or MHS-attached agencies which in all likelihood were controlled by one or other crony.

Centralized delivery of services. Certain state functions tend to gravitate according to levels of state (Cawson and Saunders 1981; Cawson 1986). Cawson and Saunders observe that it is mainly in the local state where the items of collective consumptions are provided. Majority of the eleven basic needs—water, food, clothing, shelter, health, education, sports and recreation, even power for domestic consumption, and land use regulation as an instrument for maintaining ecological balance—would normally be provided by the local government. But this was not the case under martial law. Services and commodities were made available at the local area not through the organizational structure of the local state but outside of it by means of the local field offices of national agencies. This arrangement proved beneficial to the cronies as the following account, describing the structure and mechanism for the delivery of the eleven basic needs, will illustrate.

- (1) **Water.** The operation of municipal waterworks used to be in the hands of the local governments after these works had been installed by the Bureau of Public Works. Under martial law, these were placed under para-statal bodies controlled by the Local Waterworks and Utilities Administration, a national agency. In the case of rural waterworks installation, this was transferred from the Bureau of Public Works to the Rural Waterworks Development Corpora-

tion, an attached agency of the Ministry of Human Settlements.

- (2) **Power.** Like water, the delivery of electricity for domestic consumption used to be a municipal government enterprise or commodified by private franchise holders. Marcos replaced these with electric cooperatives administered or supervised by the National Electrification Administration, an MHS-attached agency. In Metro Manila and environs, the Manila Electric Company was controlled by the Romualdez family of Mrs. Marcos.

Power generation was monopolized by the National Power Corporation which established a national grid through a series of hydro, dendro, oil-fired, coal fired, and geothermal power plants. The oil crisis in 1973 gave the government justification for building a nuclear power plant to make the country less dependent on imported oil. The contract was awarded to Westinghouse at the price of \$1.2 billion for one plant against General Electric's proposal of \$700 million for two plants. This unbelievable decision was made through the brokering of a well-known golfing partner of Mr. Marcos. Where the difference went is pretty obvious. By the time Mrs. Aquino took over in early 1986, the plant, after several years of construction and cost overruns had cost the country \$2.1 billion, but was still inoperative. The project was among those scrapped by Mrs. Aquino (Bonner 1987, 265-268).

- (3) **Food.** The production of food is of course handled by the millions of small farmers under the administrative responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. But the distribution nationwide was handled by the Ministry of Human Settlements through its attached agency, the National Food Authority, headed by a crony of Mrs. Marcos. The NFA went directly into retail distribution competing with the last bastion of Filipino private enterprise, the sari-sari (family variety) store (Bresnan, ed. 1986, 167-168). Other food items were distributed by the Food Terminal, Inc., a government company headed by Mrs. Marcos. Other agricultural cash crops which are major foreign exchange earners like sugar, coconut and banana were also the exclusive preserve of presidential cronies.

- (4) **Clothing.** Textile and garment manufacturing has been in private, usually Chinese, hands. But textile manufacturing was also listed as one of the more than fifty corporations over which one presidential crony presided. Mrs. Marcos was also known to be the owner or part owner of the more prestigious outlets of imported garments and apparel.

- (5) **Shelter.** The provision of housing has always been dominated by the private sector. Private developers built and sold houses and lots to high and middle income families. Other families built their own houses on their own lots. Government housing programs usually targeted the low income groups and squatters. There are no housing programs by local authorities. A national government agency, the National Housing Authority, attached to the MHS, had been engaged in squatter relocation. But they later abandoned the relocation program because relocation sites were too far from centers of employment and relocatees returned to the city to squat again after selling their rights. Under martial law, NHA adopted a new approach — sites and services, with funding assistance from the World Bank. The slum upgrading schemes of NHA are considered one of the more successful projects in Third World countries (Taylor and Williams 1982, 248-258). But shelter is not mere housing, according to the human settlements concept that Mrs. Marcos so ardently embraced. So Human Settlements planners at Human Settlements Development Corporation envisioned in 1981 a new town 25 kilometers east of Manila. Within a reservation of 180,000 hectares they planned a three-module city capable of accommodating one million inhabitants, mostly overspill population of Metro Manila. The design concept is that of a multi-use country town where agriculture, forestry, recreation, and parks are planned in conjunction with residential, commercial, and institutional uses. The massive scale and rugged terrain of the proposed site rendered the cost so high it was later abandoned (Phillips 1987, 235-236). A different scheme, however, was pursued with some success — the BLISS, acronym for Bagong Lipunan (New Society) Improvement of Sites and Services. The

BLISS scheme is based on the concept of "developing viable, mixed-income communities with emphasis on employment, a degree of self-sufficiency" so as to inspire a demonstration effect on surrounding communities (Phillips 1987, 237). More than twenty of these communities were built by the MHS by in-filling available vacant lands in Metro Manila. The target beneficiaries were the middle-income families who have the paying capacity so that development and construction costs could be recovered through mortgage repayments. Management of BLISS projects was by another MHS subsidiary, the BLISS Development Corporation headed by Mrs. Marcos. By the mid-1980s the executives of BDC were reportedly found to have been diverting the mortgage payments of BLISS beneficiaries into their private accounts.

- (6) **Medical services.** Thousands of medical professionals graduate from Philippine schools every year but most of them end up serving in foreign hospitals, mostly in the U.S. and western Europe. Those who remain in the country run the country's medical services. The delivery system is through the Ministry of Health which operates a hierarchy of clinics and dispensaries to general and specialized hospitals. All medical personnel receive their pay from the national government. Private practitioners complement the public health system. Privately owned hospitals are usually better equipped but their rate of fees is generally beyond the reach of the majority of the population. A limited medical insurance is available to government employees, through the Philippine Medicare program which was headed by the younger brother of Mr. Marcos. Supply procurements of the Ministry of Health was also controlled by a confessed Marcos crony.

In contrast to the poorly equipped government hospitals, some ultra-modern "medical centers" were put up by Mrs. Marcos: the Philippine Heart Center, the Lung Center of the Philippines, the Kidney Center Foundation, and the National Children's City. To make the contrast more glaring, these specialized hospitals were not placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health but under the Ministry of Human Settlements.

- (7) **Education.** Education is another highly centralized consumption service. It is delivered by a hierarchy of elementary schools, secondary schools, and state colleges and universities. Local authorities have no participation except in rare cases where they operate municipal high schools. But even in such cases their responsibility is limited to the provision of physical plant and management of their financial resources. Substantive matters are the prerogative of the Ministry of Education. Private pre-collegiate schools complement the vast network of public schools but the private sector dominates the tertiary levels.

In the late 1970s after being conferred a doctorate (*honoris causa*) by the University of the Philippines, Mrs. Marcos put up another university under the MHS empire she called "University of Life". The well-equipped "university" offered no degree courses but only seminars and correspondence courses on such subject as goat raising, cut-flower gardening, mushroom culture, and the like.

- (8) **Sports and recreation.** Organized amateur sports and recreational programs are an added function of the Ministry of Education. Professional gambling and amusements however, were under the supervision of the Games and Amusement Board under the Office of the President. The government operated casinos, race tracks and lotteries controlled by a brother of Mrs. Marcos. Public parks in provincial towns were invariably built or improved and renamed "Imelda Park". In Manila and other big cities, parks were built not for the basic need of local settlements but to lure foreign tourists. Beach resorts were developed by the Ministry of Tourism and operated by cronies, making these areas inaccessible to the general public. A huge building was erected on the Manila Bay reclamation site to house the Film Center and the Experimental Cinema of the Philippines, both headed by the elder daughter of Mrs. Marcos. Here, uncensored copies of sex movies were regularly screened attracting hordes of mostly male patrons, making enormous box office receipts.
- (9) **Livelihood.** Skills training for out-of-school youth could very well have been handled

by local authorities. But this had to be centralized as well under the National Manpower and Youth Council, also headed by Imee Marcos, the President's daughter. The University of Life and the Technology Resource Center, both MHS corporations offered correspondence courses and seminars on livelihood skills. But these skills are merely intended to enable housewives and unemployed family members to participate in the underground economy. The Marcos government also actively promoted the export of manpower especially to the Middle East. Skills training was invariably oriented to foreign job market requirements.

(10) **Mobility.** Road building was trumpeted by Mr. Marcos as one of the most outstanding achievements of his government, which indeed is. But he used his road building program to enrich his cronies. One such crony headed the private construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines which got all major construction projects of the government, including an open-ended right to charge toll fees from users of the two expressways north and south of Manila. The other beneficiary controlled the manufacture and supply of cement. This 'paved' the way for other cronies to engage in the business of land transportation. The largest bus fleet for provincial operations came under the control of a presidential son-in-law. In Metro Manila, the largest bus operator was the government-owned Metro Manila Transit Corporation headed by Mrs. Marcos. The new light rail transit in Manila is operated by Meralco, again controlled by Mrs. Marcos' clan.

Air transport used to be provided by a number of private franchises but under the Marcos government these were all bought off by state-owned Philippine Airlines. Having established a monopoly of air transport, Philippine Airlines was given to another favorite of Mrs. Marcos.

For unknown reasons, the only transport mode the Marcoses seemed to have failed to control was shipping, both coastwise and ocean-going. However, dry-docking facilities were monopolized by the government's Bataan Engineering and Shipyard Corporation, controlled by a brother of Mrs. Marcos. Telecommunications —

telephone and satellite communication facilities — were likewise controlled by Marcos and a few close friends.

(11) **Ecological balance.** Again local authorities should be in the best position to monitor and protect their immediate environment. But this function was also highly centralized in two MHS-attached agencies, the National Environmental Protection Council and the National Pollution Control Commission. This probably suited the oligarchy best because, in many instances, highly questionable decisions on the location of pollutive industries were made by them over the objections of local residents. And, though the country was suffering from the effects of overlogged forests, Marcos granted his golfing partner permit to log half-a-million hectares of pine forests in northern Luzon. This was several times higher than the constitutional limit for private logging concessions. Perhaps this was all in their business strategy. For while Mr. Marcos' friends were clearing the forest, Mrs. Marcos' Manila Seedling Bank Foundation sold seedlings for reforestation.

Thus we have seen how a seemingly innocent concept like 'human settlements' or 'basic needs' could be turned into an organizing concept and subterfuge for the systematic plunder of the nation's economy. Mrs. Marcos explained how they did it in response to an American journalist: "Some are smarter than others" (Bresnan, ed. 1986, 102).

Prospects under the Aquino government

We close this essay with what seems to lie ahead for urban planning under the Aquino government.

The Aquino government has served half of its six-year term as of this writing. Dedicated to the restoration of liberal democracy, Mrs. Aquino has started to dismantle the infrastructure of martial law. She had caused the writing of a new Constitution which now serves as the firm basis for her government. The legislature is back and local governments have had their elections lately.

The new Constitution has granted much more substantial powers to local governments than any previous constitution has done (Article X). Moreover, for the first time, the subject

of urban land reform and housing is treated explicitly under the article on Social Justice and Human Rights (Article XIII Sec. 9 & 10). Pursuant to the latter provision, appropriate bills have now been filed in both houses of Congress seeking to establish a continuing national program on urban land reform and housing, creating the institutional machinery, and appropriating funds therefor (Senate Bill No. 234 and House Bill No. 4769). There are now definite moves to decentralize the land use planning and regulation functions of the national government to the regions. The structure of two autonomous regions are slowly being put in place.

With the abolition of the Ministry of Human Settlements and the flight of the Marcoses from the country, it seems as though urban planning has lost political support. But political support does not necessarily come from the top; it can emanate from the people. As long as it can establish its value as a necessary form of state intervention it may well hold its own against competing claims of other state functions. Obviously, the future survival of urban planning will rely heavily on the extent to which the provision of consumption services can be decentralized to the local governments. Also, private property owners must accept the necessity of state regulation of private land use decisions. The issue of whether the Aquino government being a transitional one should immediately retreat from the corporatist character that it assumed under Marcos, or to continue to be an interventionist government is a valid question to raise at this point.

In the short term, the argument for centralization seems fairly strong. Considering the extent of devastation of the economy under cronyism it will certainly require a strong central leadership to rally all sectors together towards speedy recovery. State corporatism, if properly utilized, will probably help speed up such a process. The elimination of dictatorship

will encourage more dialogue and negotiation, a healthy climate for the emergence of a style of corporatism that approximate consensual or societal corporatism.

Another argument for stronger leadership by the national government is the propensity of the Filipino to look up to the national government as a father figure, the leader and provider of almost everything in life. This is recognized by Espiritu (1979) as the basis for the government's assuming a more interventionist role. The vast network of national agencies and parastatal bodies created for the delivery of 'basic needs' only reinforced that propensity. It will take considerable effort and political will to dismantle such an awesome infrastructure let alone overcome a psychological complex.

Finally, the concept of social responsibility of property ownership that the 1973 Constitution introduced and which the current Constitution likewise adopted, has not really been tested in practice. Upon the popular acceptability of this concept rests the success of urban land use planning and regulation. Past experience and current propensities point to the tremendous obstacle that must be surmounted by way of reeducating the Filipino to accept this new concept. The "privatization" thrust of the Aquino government could unnecessarily jeopardize efforts to reorient Filipino values towards social responsibility in property ownership.

The uncertainty surrounding the public acceptability of socially responsible property ownership, coupled with the necessity for maintaining central government powers — official pronouncements on local autonomy notwithstanding — has cast a cloud of doubt about the future of urban planning under the Aquino government. Yet the reported influx of investments, largely foreign, into the country is making urban — and regional — planning a matter of increasing necessity. ■

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